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435 U.S. 702 (1978).
' Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II
1978).
' See, e.g., Comments of Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America and
the College Retirement Equities Fund on Proposed Amendments to the Equal Pay Act Interpretive Bulletin (Comments submitted Oct. 23, 1978 to Director, Div. of Equal Pay and
Employment Standards, Wage and Hour Div., U.S. Dep't of Labor) [hereinafter cited as
TIAA-CREF Comments] (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review); Joint Brief
of Appellees Colby College, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association and College Retirement Equities Fund, EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (lst Cir. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Colby College Brief] (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). But see
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as some scholars. 4 The literature in support of the Court anticipated only some of the new arguments.5
The controversy arises because, in the United States at present, men have somewhat higher age-specific death rates and a
lower median age at death than women.6 Segregated actuarial tables reflect this difference in one of two ways. The first method is
to construct separate tables for each sex based upon actual mortality data. The second, and rougher, technique is known as setting
back the male table; a table is constructed for men and then applied to women after subtracting a fixed number of years from
each woman's age.7 For example, a life insurance premium calculated for sixty-year-old men might also be charged sixty-threeyear-old women. Life insurance is cheaper for women than for men
if segregated tables are used. Conversely, such tables make annuity
benefits cheaper for men than for women. Integrated tables reflect
the mortality experience of all employees, pooling the data from
both sexes. When integrated tables are used, men and women bear
equal costs for life insurance and annuities.

TIAA-CREF to Adopt a Unisex Mortality Table for Future Annuity Purchases (Press Release, Dec. 18, 1979) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
4 Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination:Manhart, 1979 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J.
83; Meltzer, Letter to Director (Comments submitted Oct. 20, 1978, to Director, Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). See also Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. REV. 199
(1979) (criticizing Manhart as wrong in principle but concluding that it states the only
workable rule).
5 This literature makes the fundamental point that Title VII requires equality for individuals and that equality for individuals requires integrated tables. But there has been little
effort to reconcile this conclusion with the situations in which Title VII has been construed
to require some form of equality for groups. None of this literature squarely addresses the
claim that using sex to predict longevity is quite different from using sex to predict employment qualifications and that an exception should be read into the statute to accommodate
this difference. Finally, this literature has tended to concede that sex would be a good predictor of mortality if Title VII did not prevent its use. The most helpful of this literature is
Key, Sex-Based Pension Plans in Perspective: City of Los Angeles, Department of Water
and Power v. Manhart, 2 HARv. WOMEN'S Crv. RIGHTS L. REV. 1 (1979); Van Alstyne, Equality for Individuals or Equality for Groups: Implications of the Supreme Court Decision in
the Manhart Case, 62 AAUP BULL. 150 (1978). See also Underwood, Law and the Crystal
Ball: PredictingBehavior with StatisticalInference and IndividualizedJudgment, 88 YALE
L.J. 1408 (1979).
6 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1979, at
70-73 (100th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]; NATIONAL CENTER FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS OF TiE
UNITED STATES, 1976 (1979). For definitions of "age-specific death rate" and "median age at
death," see notes 180, 183 infra.
See Kimball, supra note 4, at 109. Most insurers use setbacks. Id. Setbacks are a
crude approximation of actual experience.
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There are three possible resolutions to the controversy. Title
VII may require integrated tables; s it may require segregated tables;9 or it may permit employers to choose between the two. 10
This article adopts the first position. The statutory section demonstrates that basing benefits on segregated actuarial tables is disparate treatment of individuals under Title VII, that such disparate
treatment is the primary target of the statute, and that there is no
basis for a special exception to permit segregated actuarial tables.
The article then reviews the scientific literature on sex mortality
differences. It demonstrates that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the association between sex and mortality is neither stable
nor uniform. The substantial variations over time and space suggest that sex mortality differences probably have environmental
and behavioral causes, and that any sex-linked genetic component
interacts with and is heavily influenced by environmental and behavioral factors.
Our own view of Title VII does not depend on the demographic evidence. A thorough scientific analysis is nonetheless essential, for erroneous assumptions about the association between
sex and mortality have played an important role in the Manhart
literature. Some of Manhart's critics rely on such assumptions, and
the demographic evidence is offered primarily to refute them.
8 This has been the uniform holding of the courts. See City of Los Angeles v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702 (1978); EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'g 439 F.
Supp. 631 (D. Me. 1977); Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 476 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Mich. 1979);
Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Henderson v.
Oregon, 405 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Ore. 1975). This is also the position of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e)-(f) (1978). Although the guidelines
may be ambiguously phrased, no one doubts the Commission's intent. See Kimball, supra
note 4, at 93 n.28. See also Reilly v. Robertson, 266 Ind. 29, 360 N.E.2d 171 (holding segregated annuity tables unconstitutional), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
" Several critics of integrated tables imply this position. See Gerber, The Economic and
Actuarial Aspects of Selection and Classification, 10 FORUM 1205, 1227-28 (1975); Hedges,
Gender Discriminationin Pension Plans: Comment, 44 J. RISK & INS. 141, 143-44 (1977);
Kimball, supra note 4, at 102-03, 105, 137; Myers, FurtherComment, 44 J. RISK & INS. 144,
145 (1977); TIAA-CREF Comments, supra note 3, at 12, 15, 17, 34, 36-37. See also King,
Men, Women, and Life Annuities, 43 J. RISK & INS. 553, 563-65 (1976) (arguing that employer can contribute more for women than men but cannot apply integrated tables to employees' contributions).
"0 The Wage and Hour Administrator took this position for several years, see 29 C.F.R.
§ 800.116(d) (1978), but had announced his intention to withdraw this rule before his authority was transferred to the EEOC. See note 58 infra. Some critics of integrated tables
take this position, at least in the alternative. See Kimball, supra note 4, at 128-29; Meltzer,
supra note 4, at 2; TIAA-CREF Comments, supra note 3, at 18-30.
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THE LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Disparate Treatment, Disparate Impact, and Segregated
Tables
1. Individuals v. Groups. Proponents of both integrated and
segregated tables claim to offer sexual equality; the disagreement is
over whether the unit of analysis should be the individual or the
group. Consider an annuity plan with two thousand participants,
half male and half female, each of whom made equal contributions
to the plan and retired at the same age. Proponents of segregated
tables attempt11 to assure that the sum of all benefits paid to the
thousand men will equal the sum paid to the thousand womenthat sexual groups will be treated equally. But the result is sexual
inequality for individuals: every man will receive a larger periodic
benefit than any woman, and a man and a woman of equal longevity will receive unequal total benefits. Integrated tables take the
opposite approach, achieving equality at the individual level while
risking an unequal distribution of total benefits to the two groups.
The question, therefore, is whether in this context Title VII
requires equality for individuals or equality for groups. One reason
for the vigorous and so far unproductive disagreement about the
answer may be that most of the antagonists come from fundamentally different intellectual traditions with respect to the individuals-versus-groups issue. The insurance tradition analyzes risks,
premiums, and benefit schedules in terms of groups; most actuaries
cannot think of individuals except as members of groups.12 As we
shall show,13 however, the main civil rights tradition analyzes
rights in terms of individuals. Its most fundamental principle has
been that no individual shall be considered simply as part of a racial, sexual, religious, or ethnic group, or treated differently because of his membership in such a group.
The issue has been further complicated by the introduction
into Title VII law of analyses based, in whole or in part, on equality for groups. The first such innovation was the disparate-impact
theory-that facially neutral employment practices with unequal
effects on racial or sexual groups violate Title VII if not justified
"

They can never succeed. See text at notes 277-279 infra.

12 See, e.g., TIAA-CREF Comments, supra note 3, at 27 ("Insurance by its nature re-

quires reference to groups").
" See text at notes 37-83 infra.
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by business necessity."' Another was the authorization of voluntary
group-based remedies to integrate traditionally segregated occupations. 15 These developments have somewhat blurred the traditional
emphasis on individuals in civil rights law. They lend colorable
support to efforts to read theories of group equality derived from
insurance policy into Title VII, but as we shall demonstrate, 16 the
insurance industry's theory is an unwarranted extension of
disparate-impact theory.
Despite the introduction of these group theories into Title VII
law, the prohibition of disparate treatment of individuals remains
dominant. Manhart relied on this disparate-treatment theory,17 in
which the essence of the wrong is to ignore individual characteristics and treat individuals on the basis of group affiliation, as when
an employer refuses to hire an applicant because he is black.' 8 Perhaps ironically,' 9 disparate treatment is the oldest, narrowest, and
least controversial theory of discrimination.
The leading disparate-impact case is Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 20 in which an employer required a high school diploma and a
passing test score as conditions of employment for certain positions. Although the requirement did not explicitly differentiate between blacks and whites, it had unequal impact on racial groups
because a smaller percentage of blacks had diplomas and passed
the test. Consequently, the requirement was held unlawful unless
the employer could show "business necessity" for it-that the employment requirement was actually related to job performance. 1
As Griggs illustrates, criteria that cannot be used by an employer under Title VII may be statistically associated with other
" See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
See text at notes 47-65, 71-83 infra.
17 435 U.S. at 708-09.
18 See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
19 Many critics of Manhart take a narrow view of the statute and are hostile to theories
15
18

of group equality in other contexts. Thus, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, the
only dissenters from the individual approach in Manhart,were also the only dissenters from
the group approach in Weber. On the other hand, Justices Stewart, White, and Marshall
joined the majority opinions in both cases. Similarly, compare Meltzer, supra note 4 with
Meltzer, The Weber Case: The JudicialAbrogation of the AntidiscriminationStandard in
Employment, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 423 (1980).
20 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Other important disparate-impact cases are New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) and Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977).
21 401 U.S. at 431.
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criteria in which employers are legitimately interested. When such
an association exists, employers intent on pursuing the legitimate
criterion inevitably run afoul of either disparate-impact or disparate-treatment theory. If they distinguish on the basis of the forbidden criterion, as a way of predicting the legitimate one, they are
guilty of disparate treatment. If they use the permissible criterion
directly, they will cause disparate impact, since by hypothesis that
criterion is associated with the forbidden one. In the latter case,
employers must show a business necessity for using the permissible
criterion. 2
Which theory applies in the event of litigation thus depends
on how an employer formulates his requirement. The classic illustration is Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,23 in which the employer
refused to hire women for certain manufacturing jobs because employees in those jobs had to lift heavy weights. The exclusion of
women was disparate treatment, and illegal. 4 The fact that many
women were unable to lift the weights was irrelevant to the case of
a woman who could; sex could not be used to predict her weightlifting ability. The company was permitted, however, to require applicants for these jobs to pass a weight-lifting test.2 5 This policy
would have disparate impact on women, and the company would
have to justify it by showing business necessity-in this case, that
lifting the weights was necessary to operation of the plant. Note
that in the disparate-impact case, individuals of equal weight-lifting ability would be treated alike, regardless of their sex; in the
disparate-treatment case, individuals of equal weight-lifting ability
but different sex would be treated differently. In short, the test of
disparate treatment is whether any difference in treatment remains after controlling for all variables other than sex.
The association between sex and mortality is no different from
any other association between forbidden and permissible criteria.
American women as a group currently live longer than American
men as a group, just as they are able to lift less weight as a group.
But some women will die earlier than some men, just as some will
be able to lift more weight. An employer who pays annuities on the
basis of integrated tables in effect distinguishes among his employees on the permissible basis of longevity, for those individuals who

22

Id.

23

416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).

24

Id. at 715-18.

25Id. at 718.
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live the longest will collect the most periodic payments and thus
the largest total sum. Of course, the employer's practice may have
disparate impact on men, for as a group they may not live to collect as many periodic payments as women. If he tries to avoid this
disparate impact by using segregated tables-making larger periodic payments to all men as a group-he distinguishes on the basis
of sex. This would be disparate treatment, for individual men and
women of equal longevity would be treated differently: 26 both periodic benefits and total benefits will be greater for a man than for a
27
woman of equal longevity.
2. The Expectancy Argument. Professor Kimball attempts
to avoid this analysis by arguing that one should not compare actual cash benefits received, either periodic or total. Rather, he suggests, one must compare the expected values of the annuities as of
the date of retirement. 8 Because women as a group live longer
than men as a group, he argues that each woman has a greater life
expectancy than each man. It would follow that under a properly
constructed segregated annuity table that provides larger periodic
benefits to men, the expected value of future payments would be
the same for all individuals. Actual longevity would be irrelevant,
for "[t]heir expectations were identical at the beginning."2 9 He
concludes that a sexually integrated actuarial table "is a pure
26 It has been suggested that to predict on the basis of a person's sex is to treat him
more individually than to predict simply on the basis of his being human. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 727-28 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Kimball, supra note 4, at 119. But this misses the point of Title VII. The statute does
not require that people be treated individually in some absolute or abstract sense; it requires that they be treated individually with respect to race, sex, religion, and national origin. A person is treated individually with respect to sex if no generalization based on real or
supposed average characteristics of his sex is applied to him.
217One might argue that an annuity based on segregated tables is the economic
equivalent of a lump sum retirement benefit of equal size for both sexes, and that it is
arbitrary to call the former disparate treatment and the latter equal treatment. But the two
alternatives are not economically equivalent for individuals. Just as it is necessary to compare individuals of equal weight-lifting ability in the case of sex and weight lifting, it is
necessary to compare individuals of equal longevity in the case of sex and longevity. A man
and a woman who retire at the same age and die at the same age will receive equal total
benefits from an annuity paid under integrated tables, or from an equal lump sum distribution at retirement. Either is equal treatment.
28 Kimball, supra note 4, at 101-02.
29 Id. at 102. Similar arguments are made by Colby College Brief, supra note 3, at 4-6;
Hedges, supra note 9, at 141-43; Kimball, supra note 4, at 122-23, 137; King, supra note 9,
at 560-62; Rutherglen, supra note 4, at 242-43, 247-48; Meltzer, supra note 4, at 5-6; TIAACREF Comments, supra note 3, at 10-12, 23-25.
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fiction, a way of concealing the truth."3
This expectancy argument begs the question in a fundamental
way. The ultimate issue is precisely whether mortality data may be
classified by sex for the purpose of paying annuities-that is,
whether sex may be used to predict longevity. No expectancy can
be calculated until that question has been answered. The statement that some particular person is expected to live some certain
number of years is dependent on a prior decision about how to
classify- that person.31 It is circular to use the expectancies generated by a predictor to justify using that predictor. This may be
illustrated by a simple example.
Consider the life expectancy of a newborn black male in South
Carolina. Prediction of his life expectancy may or may not take
into account his sex, race, and residence. If he is classified as a
nonwhite male South Carolinian, his life expectancy is 58.33 years.
If he is classified simply as a resident of the United States, his life
expectancy is 70.75 years. The other possibilities range in between;
he may be a nonwhite South Carolinian, a male South Carolinian,
a nonwhite male American, a male American, a nonwhite American, or a South Carolinian. He has eight different life expectancies32-and just on the basis of the three predictors intro-

"0Kimball,

supra note 4, at 138.

3' In statistics textbooks, expectancy or "arithmetic mean" is always defined by refer-

ence to some particular body of data. See, e.g., J. FREUND, MODERN ELEMENTARY STATISTICS
33 (4th ed. 1973); R. HOGG & A. CRAIG, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATIsTIcs 34 (2d
ed. 1965).
32

EXPECTATION OF LIFE AT BIRTH

(Selected Categories, 1969 - 1971)
United States

South Carolina

All persons
All males
All non-whites

70.75
67.04
64.95

67.96
63.85
62.64

Non-white males

60.98

58.33

SOURCE: Greville, Some Trends and Comparisons of United States Life-Table
Data: 1900-1971, in 1 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION

& WELFARE,

No. 4 Table 4, at 4-10 (1975).

U.S.

DECENNIAL

LIFE TABLES

FOR

1969-71,
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duced so far. We could generate many more expectancies by considering such predictors as urban or rural residence, socioeconomic
status, and family medical history.
No one of these expectancies is any more statistically valid
than the others.3 Our hypothetical infant is a member of all eight
groups; all eight expectancies are his expectancies. A newborn
black female in South Carolina has a greater life expectancy only if
one has already decided to use sex as a predictor; if sex is not used,
the two infants have identical expectancies. Thus, an "equal expected value" test is futile: it can be satisfied by either integrated
or segregated tables. 4
The relationship between data classification and expectancy is
obscured by talking in terms of the "average man" and the "average woman," for that language presupposes that data will be classified by sex. The terminology does, however, highlight what employers are doing when they classify data by sex: they are treating
every woman as though she were at the mean of the distribution
for women, and every man as though he were at the mean of the
distribution for men. Professor Kimball's individual expected values are merely applications of group averages to individuals, 5 and
that is quintessential disparate treatment. His insistence that segSS In a certain sense, a prediction might be said to be "truer" the more information it
took into account. If this is the criterion, our hypothetical infant must be treated as a black
male South Carolinian-and, the prediction must be made more detailed if possible. But no
insurance company would so classify him; he would be treated as a male American, or just
an American. Adding more predictors does not necessarily make the prediction more accurate; relying on an unstable or spurious association may make the prediction less accurate.
See Kimball, supra note 4, at 112. This supposed criterion of "maximum predictive power"
is also frequently overridden because the expectancies generated may not be administrable
at an acceptable cost, id. at 107-08, 118-20, or socially acceptable, CoMmiTT ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF AcTuARiEs, RISK CLASSIFICATION STATEMENT OF PRINCI-

PLES 20-21 (Exposure Draft, Oct. 19, 1979) [hereinafter cited as RISK CLASSIFICATION] (on file

with The University of Chicago Law Review). The important point is that no "true" expectancy can be generated by purely mathematical methods; considerations of social policy and
administrative convenience are always called into play.
3, "Actuaries know that 'actuarial equivalence' is not an absolute measure but one
which depends upon the mortality and interest assumptions made beforehand." Anderson,
A Critiqueof the ManhartBrief, THE AcTuARY, May 1978, at 6. Anderson indicates that it
is error "to imply the existence of an absolute actuarial equivalence," id., and that there "is
no compelling actuarial reason" to use sex as a predictor, id. at 7.
35 The general problem is discussed in A. AYER, PROBABILITY AND EVIDENCE 52 (1972).
After a discussion about why there is no "true" individual expectancy, Ayer argues that an
expectancy that seems to describe individuals can only be understood as an elliptical statement about the distribution of some property in a group. He concludes that "the judgments
of probability of which the frequency theory gives an adequate account are those in which
we are not concerned with individual cases." Id.
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regated tables equalize the expected value of benefits to be paid is
simply a reformulation of the claim that segregated tables provide
equal benefits to the two sexes considered as groups. As another
critic of Manhart acknowledges, this argument against integrated
tables is based on their disparate impact.3 6
The effect of the expectancy formulation is merely to obfuscate the real issue: may sex be used to calculate life expectancy in
the first place? To answer that question, one must resolve the apparent conflict between disparate treatment and disparate impact.
B.

The Meaning of the Statute

The 88th Congress, which adopted the Equal Pay Act of
196337 as well as Title VII, addressed itself to the choice between
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Those terms were not
yet coined, but the concepts are evident in the legislative debates
and in the texts of both statutes.
Opponents of Title VII repeatedly charged that the bill would
lead to quotas and would ban all employment practices that interfered with proportionate representation of protected groupsthose that had a disparate impact. 3s There was particular concern
about seniority rules, because blacks would have no seniority with
employers who had previously refused to hire them,3 9 and about
ability tests,4 0 because a state hearing examiner had just suggested
that tests with disparate impact on blacks, even if job related, violated Illinois's antidiscrimination law. 4. Thus, the underlying conflict between equality for groups and equality for individuals was
already presented, along with some of the most important practical
applications of disparate-impact theory.
The proponents of Title VII repeatedly answered that the bill
provided equal opportunity for individuals and banned what we
would now call disparate treatment. Senator Humphrey, the
majority floor manager of the bill, offered the following definition

36 Rutherglen, supra note 4, at 247-48. See Gerber, supra note 9, at 1228; Hedges,
supra note 9, at 144; Kimball, supra note 4, at 103-05.
37 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
3 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-08 (1979) (collecting legislative
history); id. at 231-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same).
", See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 350-51 (1977).
40 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
", Myart v. Motorola Inc., No. 63C-127 (Ill. Fair Empl. Prac. Comm'n, Feb. 26, 1964),
reprinted in 110 CONG. REc. 5662 (1964), enforcement denied sub nom. Motorola Inc. v.
Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 34 Ill. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286 (1966).
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of discrimination: "[T]he meaning of racial or religious discrimination is perfectly clear .... [I]t means a distinction in treatment
given to different individuals because of their different race, religion, or national origin. ' 42 Similar statements appear throughout
the legislative history;4 3 no proponent of the statute ever suggested
that groups as such were to be treated equally."4 The same unambiguous emphasis on equal treatment of individuals appears in the
statutory text. It is unlawful for an employer to
REC. 5423 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
4'See, e.g., id. at 1540 (remarks of Rep. Lindsay); id. at 6000, 6553, 13088 (remarks of
Sen. Humphrey); id. at 6564 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); id. at 7207 (interpretive memorandum prepared by Department of Justice and introduced into record by Sen. Clark); id. at
7213 (interpretive memorandum prepared by Sens. Clark and Case, the bipartisan captains
responsible for Title VII); id. at 7253 (remarks of Sen. Case); id. at 9881 (remarks of Sen.
Allott); id. at 14465 (brief description of Title VII from Bi-Partisan Civil Rights Newsletter
No. 28, inserted into record by Sen. Hart). The frequent references to quotas and racial
balance in these statements simply reflect that that was the context in which the choice
between individual and group equality was most squarely posed. The same principle that
precludes systematic efforts to maintain racial'balance in the allocation of jobs precludes
attempts to maintain sexual balance in the allocation of annuity benefits. Congress was
aware that its debate over racial balance involved an issue of general principle that turned
on the meaning of "discriminate"; opponents of the bill repeatedly complained that the
word had not been defined in the bill and'would be construed in a way that required racial
balance. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 67-68 (1963) (Minority Report), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2436; 110 CONG. REc. 8428 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Robertson); id. at 14311 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); id. at 15892 (remarks of Rep. Meader).
44The only significant discordant note in the legislative history is Senator Humphrey's
famous statement that the Bennett amendment would permit employers to set different
retirement ages for men and women. 110 CONG. REc. 13663-64 (1964). This statement is
irrelevant to the choice between individual and group equality; it would permit open discrimination against both individuals and groups, without a hint of an actuarial or any other
rationale. It is so inconsistent with any conceivable meaning of the statutory language, and
so inconsistent with any other views advanced by either side in the legislative history, that it
has been generally disregarded by the courts. In Manhart, the Supreme Court concluded
that this "isolated comment on the Senate floor cannot change the effect of the plain language of the statute itself." 435 U.S. at 714. And sex differences in retirement ages, the very
subject of Senator Humphrey's comment, have been struck down by the lower courts. Rosen
v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973); Bartness v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc.,
444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). The Supreme Court relied on
Senator Humphrey's statement in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 144 (1976), but
Congress quickly expressed its disapproval of that case, without mentioning the Senator's
statement, H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 4749, 4750. The academic proponents of segregated tables have not relied on Senator Humphrey's statement. For further analysis of the statement, see Bernstein
& Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classification in Pension Programs, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1218 n.50 (1974); Gold, Equality of Opportunity in Retirement
Funds, 9 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 596, 599-602 (1976); Lines, Sex-Based Fringe Benefits-Annuities and Life Insurance, 16 J. FAM. L. 489, 504-06 (1978).
42 110 CONG.
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(1) . . . refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual.
because
of such individual's . . . sex . . .or (2). . .classify his employees or applicants. . . in any way which would deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status . . . because of such individual's...
sex .... 45
The statutory text and legislative history taken as a whole thus
leave no room for doubt. There is consensus that the original congressional understanding of discrimination, and the primary target
of the statute, was disparate treatment of individuals.48
The conflict between- disparate treatment and disparate impact was faced most directly in a number of provisions limiting
disparate-impact liability, the most important of which for our
purposes are the exceptions to the Equal Pay Act. These excep47
tions are incorporated into Title VII by the Bennett amendment,
which provides that "differentiation" by sex in compensation does
not violate Title VII if the differentiation is authorized by the
Equal Pay Act.
The Equal Pay Act forbids discrimination in pay on the basis
of sex, except where the pay differential is based on seniority,
merit, productivity, or "any other factor other than sex."' 48 At first
reading, this language presents a conundrum. The exception seems
to protect a nonexistent category: discrimination on the basis of
sex that is not on the basis of sex. But in the context of the objections made by congressional opponents of antidiscrimination legislation, the meaning is clear. It is that disparate impact in pay does
not violate the Equal Pay Act, and hence does not violate the ban
on sex discrimination in Title VII: one sex as a group may earn
more than the other if the difference is based on seniority, merit,
productivity, or any factor other than sex itself.
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) (emphasis added).

B.

46 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977);
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1 (1976); Kimball, supra note

4, at 91 n.22.
47 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (second sentence)) (floor amendment proposed by Sen. Bennett and approved by voice vote).
4'No employer ... shall discriminate ... on the basis of sex by paying wages ... at
a rate less than the rate at which he pays ... the opposite sex... except where such
payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential
based on any other factor other than sex.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
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The brief debate on the Equal Pay Act bill focused on these
exceptions in response to opposition led by Representative Findley. He argued that the bill would deprive women of employment
opportunities because it made no allowance for the additional costs
that he believed were associated with hiring women-costs that
opponents of the bill attributed to higher turnover, restrictive state
legislation, the need for special facilities,
and female responsibili49
ties as mothers and homemakers.

Proponents of the bill responded that most differences in costs
could be calculated on an individual basis,50 and rejected the Findley amendment, which was apparently intended to permit costs to
be calculated on the basis of sexual categories. 51 Representative
Griffin offered the clearest explanation of how costs could be considered under the bill.52 He analyzed assumed associations between
sex and time worked and between sex and absenteeism in precisely
the way we have analyzed the association between sex and mortality." The employer could not use sex to predict absenteeism, but
he could penalize absenteeism even if that caused disparate impact
on women. Representative Goodell, a key sponsor of equal-pay legislation, also argued that costs could be considered if calculated
with respect to particular employees and not on the basis of sexual
categories."
" H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1963) (additional views of Rep. Findley),
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687, 691-92; 109 CONG. REC. 9205 (1963)
(remarks of Rep. Findley); id. at 9213 (remarks of Rep. Fisher); Kimball, supra note 4, at
133-34 (reviving the objection); Meltzer, supra note 4, at 1, 4-5 (same). See also Bernstein &
Williams, Sex Discrimination in Pensions: Manhart's Holding v. Manhart's Dictum, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1241, 1242-47 (1978) (proposing a dubious prophylactic rule to remedy the
problem); Bernstein & Williams, supra note 44, at 1212-13 (same).

reprinted in [1963] U.S.

50109 CONG. REc. 9217 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell). Thus, proponents of the bill
claimed that the Findley amendment was redundant: considering costs on an individual
basis would give the employer the same savings as considering them on a group basis. Even

so, proponents said only that "most" costs could be computed individually; they did not say
"all" costs.

"I The proposed amendment would have permitted "a differential which does not exceed ascertainable and specific added cost resulting from employment of the opposite sex."
Id.
109 CONG. REC. 9205-06 (remarks of Rep. Griffin).
'3 See text at notes 25-27 supra.
81

6" 109 CONG. REc. 9206, 9217 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell). It might be argued that,
if an insurer charges an employer one rate for each man and a higher rate for each woman,

the employer may pass these rates on to his employees as an individually calculated cost
difference. But these cost differences do not reflect individual differences; they reflect the
fact that the employer has chosen to do business, and to require his employees to do business, with an insurer who calculates costs on the basis of group averages. If that were permissible, actuarial arguments would be irrelevant; the insurer could cover men for free and

The University of Chicago Law Review

[47:505

We do not mean to suggest that Congress in 1963 had thought
through all the implications of the distinction between disparate
treatment of individuals and disparate impact on groups, or that it
fully understood and specifically contemplated the application of
that distinction to insurance. Indeed, Congress had not yet formulated its ideas with sufficient precision to express them in clear and
concise statutory language. The drafters ineptly used "on the basis
of sex" and "based on . . . sex" in the same sentence to mean
quite different things; the sentence would be nonsensical if both
phrases had the same meaning. The Findley amendment was also
ambiguous, as were some comparably concise statements in the
legislative history.5 5 But there is no ambiguity in the statements by
sponsors of the bill who took time to explain what they meant and
to illustrate their points with examples. The legislative history
taken as a whole leaves little doubt that the key distinction was
between consideration of differences among individual employees
and consideration of sexual group averages-the same distinction
that dominated the debates on Title VII a year later.
The first interpretive rules issued by the Wage and Hour Ad-

charge double or triple for women, and the employer could pass these charges on to women
as individual costs. No one claims that that is the law. The passing-on argument was not
addressed in the legislative history. Representative Griffin assumed in an illustration that an
employer could pay women less if they worked shorter hours because of state laws requiring
rest periods for women. 109 CONG. REc. 9205-06 (1963). But this does not cast light on the
passing-on argument because in 1963 the employer could have imposed discriminatory restperiod rules directly. Representative Griffin was discussing the Equal Pay Act bill, which
affected only compensation; Title VII's ban on discrimination in terms and conditions of
employment was enacted a year later.
A variation of the passing-on argument is that periodic annuity benefits are not the
proper measure of compensation, because they are not received pay period by pay period in
direct exchange for work, but that instead, either the employer's contribution or the present
actuarial value of the future periodic benefits is the measure. Kimball, supra note 4, at 9799, 137. The flaw in the reasoning is the claim that the employer's contributions are always
equal to the employee's compensation, see id. at 101. Suppose the employer contributed
$1,000 to an annuity plan for his male employees and $1,000 to purchase albatrosses for his
female employees. The contributions would be equal, but the compensation would not be,
even if he paid a fair market price for the albatrosses. Compensation is what the employees
receive for the employer's contribution. See Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 155. In the case of
an annuity plan, they receive contractual entitlements to future payments, subject to certain
contingencies. Employees receive these entitlements pay period by pay period, if that zhatters. The value of the entitlements is the present expected value of the future payments,
and that, as we have noted, depends on whether sex is used to calculate the expectancy. See
fext at notes 28-36 supra.
11 S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963); 109 CONG. REC. 9200 (1963) (remarks
of Rep. Dwyer). Neither of these statements is inconsistent with the view that cost cannot
be calculated on the basis of sexual groups.
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ministrator were consistent with this legislative history. He construed the Equal Pay Act exceptions as permitting disparate impact but not disparate treatment, and concluded that sex could
play no part 58 in the calculation of wage differentials based on
other factors. A subsequent interpretive rule specifically addressed
the claim that the average cost of hiring women exceeded the average cost of hiring men, and concluded that wage differentials based
on such average differences violated the Act, for the differentials
would necessarily be applied to individual workers on the basis of
sex.57 This interpretive rule was relied on in an early district court
decision rejecting, as a defense to a charge of disparate treatment,
the argument that insurance costs for unemployment compensation, workmen's compensation, and accident and health coverage
were higher for women. 8
Exceptions similar to those in the Equal Pay Act were written
into Title VII itself, and provide a valuable analogy. Section
703(h) 59 protects discrimination on the basis of seniority, merit,
productivity, location, or ability tests. The exceptions contain the
same arguable conundrum as the Equal Pay Act. Since discrimina-

51 29 Fed. Reg. 5555 (1964) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 800.142 (1979)).
'1 31 Fed. Reg. 2657 (1966) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1979)).
" Wirtz v. Midwest Mfg. Corp., 18 Wage and Hour Cas. 556, 560 (S.D. Ill. 1968). The
two interpretive rules described in text have never been repealed or modified, but the Administrator seemed to consider them inapplicable to employee-benefit plans. Instead, he issued an interpretive rule that gave employers the option of using either segregated or integrated tables. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1978). This rule is inconsistent with the more general
rules that sex cannot be the cause of pay differentials and that no allowance can be made
for average cost differences between the sexes. The Administrator never explained or justified the exception, and after Manhart he announced his intention to withdraw it in favor of
a rule requiring integrated tables. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,029 (1978). No action was taken on the
proposal because enforcement responsibility was transferred to the EEOC. 43 Fed. Reg.
19,807 (1978).
59 Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided
that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or
used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not
be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation
paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized
by the provisions of section 206(d) of title 29.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
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tion on the basis of seniority, merit, productivity, location, or ability test is not on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin,
the exceptions are arguably meaningless. But again, the meaning is
clear in context. Section 703(h) was inserted to allay fears, mentioned earlier,60 that seniority, merit, productivity, and ability tests
would be held illegal because of disparate impact on blacks. The
Supreme Court has consistently construed section 703(h) in this
way. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 61 the Court noted that seniority would be illegal under disparate-impact theory were it not for the seniority clause.6 2 In
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,e3 the Court read the testing clause to
express congressional rejection of the view that any test with disparate impact was illegal.6 4
In sum, the 88th Congress feared that its antidiscrimination
legislation would be construed as forbidding disparate impact in
situations where that was not intended, and it responded with
badly drafted exceptions that can only be construed to mean that
disparate impact is not forbidden in the various circumstances indicated. The Bennett amendment thus disposes of the controversy.
Equal periodic annuity benefits are not illegal discrimination
against men, for the amendment permits disparate impact on either sex in compensation. 5 If it happens that men as a group collect less than women as a group, the difference is due to some "factor other than sex," namely, actual longevity. Just as men as a
group may get higher wages if they have greater average seniority,
women as a group may collect higher total pension benefits if more
of them live longer.
The Bennett amendment also refutes the more restrained argument that Title VII leaves employers free to use either integrated or segregated tables. This argument is based on alleged legislative silence: since segregated actuarial tables were not explicitly

80

See text and notes at notes 38-41 supra.

61 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
62 Id. at 349-50.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
" Id. at 434-36. Both the seniority and testing clauses are limited by provisos, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971); see note 59 supra; many tests and some seniority systems are
unprotected. But the provisos are irrelevant for present purposes; what matters is that the
main clauses, which parallel the Equal Pay Act exceptions, have been construed as authorizing disparate impact.
"6This argument is made in Manhart,435 U.S. at 710 n.20, 713 n.24, but too succinctly
for some commentators, see Kimball, supra note 4, at 124.
63
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addressed in the statutory text or legislative history, and since it
would have been controversial to prohibit them, Congress cannot
be presumed to have done so." But this is a curious form of legislative-silence argument. No one has suggested that Title VII is inapplicable.6 7 That would permit unlimited extra payments to men
without regard to actuarial tables. Rather, the argument is that the
statute requires some form of equality in the insurance context,
but that Congress must have meant to allow the employer to
choose either individual or group equality.
The statute should not be construed on the basis of such speculation. Congress made a deliberate choice between the principles
of no-disparate-treatment-of-individuals and no-disparate-impacton-groups. In the context of sex and compensation, the Bennett
amendment and the Equal Pay Act exceptions explicitly reflect
that choice. The task of statutory construction is to apply to particular cases the principle Congress selected, not to speculate about
what principle it might have chosen had it debated employer-sponsored insurance plans at greater length. Congress was not required
to list all potential applications, or even all controversial applications.6 8 The principle itself was controversial, as was the inclusion
of sex within the principle.6 9 Moreover, Congress was not 7unaware
0
that the principle had implications for insurance benefits.
This view of the statute is supported by the congressional re1 1
in which the Supreme
sponse to General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,

Court held that Title VII is not violated by the exclusion of pregnancy from an otherwise comprehensive disability insurance plan.
Congress promptly required that pregnancy be covered on the
same terms as any other disability,7 2 announcing that this had
been its original intent.7 8 And Congress so reacted despite evidence

that disability insurance cost more for women than men even with"

Kimball, supra note 4, at 95 n.35.
67 Professor Kimball acknowledges that annuities are "compensation" within the mean-

ing of Title VII. Kimball, id. at 97-99.
68 See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969). See also Busic v. United States, 100
S. Ct. 1747, 1752 (1980).
' See 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler).
70 See id. at 13490-92 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen and vote of Senate) (refusing to
add age to list of forbidden criteria for fear of disrupting insurance plans); Bernstein &
Williams, supra note 44, at 1218-19; Lines, supra note 44, at 500-01.
71 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
71

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1978).

73 H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4750.
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out pregnancy coverage; such coverage would require employers to
spend an additional $191.5 million per year on female employees. 4
Thus the statutory provision rejects both the view that the amount
spent on men as a group should equal the amount spent on women
as a group, and its corollary, that cost calculations can be based on
sexually segregated actuarial tables.
The Bennett amendment compels the conclusion that segregated tables violate Title VII, because it speaks directly to the
meaning of sex discrimination in compensation. But the argument
does not depend on the Bennett amendment; that provision simply
reflects the underlying values that led to the statute's enactment
and inform its construction. When the ban on disparate treatment
conflicts with the partial ban on disparate impact, the former must
control.
Yet Manhart's critics argue for the opposite; they would encourage or require disparate treatment as a remedy for the disparate impact caused by paying benefits subject to a life contingency.
The same argument would suggest eliminating the disparate impact of a test by adding points to the scores of the disadvantaged
racial group. That has not been the customary remedy; instead,
courts have enjoined use of the test unless its continued use was
justified by business necessity.75 Similarly, the disparate impact of
benefits subject to life contingencies could be eliminated by eliminating the life contingency. 76 But that is neither required nor wise;
there is consensus that such contingencies are a business necessity.7 7 It follows that unequal total payments to sexual groups are
74 Id. at 9, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4757. See also General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 130-31 nn.9-10 (1976).
7' The two Supreme Court decisions holding tests illegal are Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Neither specified the remedy, but each opinion implied that unvalidated tests with disparate impact cannot be used. 422 U.S. at 436 ("outright reversal" of holding that tests were job related "implied that an injunction should immediately issue against all use of testing"); 401 U.S. at
431 ("If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited"); id. at 436. The lower courts have
generally enjoined all use of such tests. E.g., Waiston v. School Bd., 566 F.2d 1201, 1203-04
(4th Cir. 1977); Jones v. New York City Human Resources Admin., 528 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.
1976); Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1026 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 465 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1979). But
see Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 482 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), discussed in note 80 infra. Some lower courts have ordered quota hiring as a remedy,
B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 46, at 1199-1221, and some defendants may have
complied with such orders by adjusting minority test scores.
76 See Kimball, supra note 4, at 132-33.
7' For explanations of the benefits of life contingencies, see id.; Meltzer, supra note 4,
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legal. In any event, disparate treatment of individuals is a violation, not a remedy.
This conclusion is not changed by the new Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures.7 8 These Guidelines apparently
attempt to authorize employers to add points to the scores of disadvantaged groups when tests have differential validity.7 9 That is
the testing situation most analogous to segregated actuarial tables,
but it rarely exists in the real world, and the guideline has not
been tested in litigation. 0 The new guideline is an erroneous interpretation of the statute,"' for the same reasons that preclude the
use of segregated actuarial tables.8 2 The proper remedy is to enjoin
the use of differentially valid tests. Even if the guideline is valid,
the Bennett amendment precludes its extension to sex in life insurance and ainuities.8 3

at 4, 8; TIAA-CREF Comments, supra note 3, at 34. On the business-necessity defense generally, see Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-ImpactLiability Under
Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911 (1979).
78 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978), 29 C.F.R. § 1607
(1979).
79 Id. § 1607.14.B(8)(d) (1979). A test has differential validity if it predicts for one race
and not another, or if it predicts differently for different races. In the new guidelines, this
phenomenon is referred to as "unfairness."
so The literature on differential validity is collected in Lerner, Washington v. Davis:
Quantity, Quality and Equality in Employment Testing, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 263, 294-95.
Differential validity was found in Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs.,
482 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court relied on the guideline and approved a consent decree providing for adjustment of minority test scores. Intervenors who challenged the
consent decree did not question the validity of the guideline.
a' The EEOC guideline is entitled to deference but is not a regulation with the force of
law. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-43 (1976); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973).
82 Some applicants of both races will perform better on the job than predicted by their
test score, and some will perform worse, just as some men and women will live longer than
predicted and some will die sooner. To adjust all black scores upward may equalize group
averages in this situation, but it would be unfair treatment of individuals: blacks who would
not perform better than predicted would get an undeserved advantage, and whites who
would perform better than predicted would not get the advantage given similarly situated
blacks. Race would be used as a predictor of job performance in order to offset disparate
impact. The guideline cannot be upheld on this rationale, though some applications of it
might conceivably be upheld on the group-remedy rationale of United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), discussed in text at notes 92-95 infra. There is no indication
that the EEOC is aware of the tension between this guideline and its guidelines on life
insurance and annuities, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e)-(f) (1979), and on disparate treatment in
testing, id. § 1607.11.
83 A prima facie case of illegal disparate impact is a prerequisite to application of the
differential-validity guideline. The Bennett amendment precludes such a prima facie case by
providing that disparate impact by sex in compensation is not illegal. See text and notes at
notes 47-66 supra.
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The Case for an Exception

The ban on disparate treatment is not quite absolute; narrow
exceptions have been recognized. But segregated actuarial tables
are unlikely subjects for such an exception, because the argument
in their favor depends upon the principle of group equality that
Congress so plainly refused to enact. The burden of overcoming
congressional silence thus falls on those who would imply an
exception.
1. Existing Exceptions. There is only one explicit exception
to the statutory prohibition of sex-based disparate treatment. An
employer may hire one sex exclusively if sex is a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ").8 4 This exception is "extremely narrow. 8 5 So far, the Supreme Court has upheld a. BFOQ defense
only where an applicant's inability to perform was found to result
from her "very womanhood,"86 a phrase that seems to exclude factors merely associated with sex. The BFOQ defense therefore does
not authorize use of sex to predict other facts such as longevity.
And whatever its breadth, the BFOQ exception is inherently inapplicable to segregated actuarial tables because they do not set occupational qualifications.8 7 Rather, they affect compensation for
employees who are admittedly qualified.
The lower federal courts have almost uniformly recognized a
second exception, not mentioned in the statute: grooming standards that differ by sex.88 These cases seem to rest either on the
rationale that there is no difference in treatment if grooming standards of comparable strictness are applied to both sexes,8 9 or that
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
88 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).

8 Id. at 336. For an explicit statement that statistical associations cannot be the basis
of a BFOQ defense, see Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(ii) (1979).
W The statutory language unambiguously limits the defense to occupational qualifications. Even if the language were less explicit, the defense could not be extended to discrimination in compensation, for that would implicitly amend the Equal Pay Act despite clear
congressional intent, reflected in the Bennett amendment, not to do so.
88 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 46, at 344-60; id. at 99-100 (Supp. 1979).
81 This was also the rationale of a recent holding that an employer may refuse to hire
men with a sexual preference for men even though it hires women with a sexual preference
for men. Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1979). But cf. Faraca
v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir.) (illegal to discriminate against applicants who are married to a'spouse of the opposite race), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1006 (1975). The De.1antis court
relied on congressional refusals to amend Title VII explicitly to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sexual preference. 608 F.2d at 329. Professor Rutherglen has implied that the
homosexuality cases, the grooming cases, and the sexual-privacy cases, see B. ScHLEi & P.
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any discrimination involved is trivial. Efforts to extend this exception to more burdensome e" or more offensive9 1 disparate treatment
have been unsuccessful. Segregated actuarial tables cannot be justified as a grooming standard or by a more general triviality exception, for they cause men and women of equal longevity to pay or
receive substantially different amounts of money.
A third exception was recognized in United Steelworkers v.
Weber,9 2 in which the Supreme Court upheld temporary disparate
treatment by private employers attempting "to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories."9 3
Although the Court has not yet applied the rule to sex,94 Weber is
the strongest support for segregated tables, for it is the only Supreme Court holding that exempts disparate treatment from Title
VII by focusing on groups instead of individuals. The affirmative
action plan in Weber gave blacks preferential treatment, not because the individual beneficiaries of the plan had been discriminated against, but because other blacks had been. The plan was
intended to give blacks as a group a fairer share of available jobs.
Similarly, the argument for segregated annuity tables is not that
any particular man will fail to collect a proportionate share of all
the dollars paid into the plan, but that men as a group will fail to
do so.
Despite this similarity, the Weber exception does not justify
segregated mortality tables. The Court's holding in Weber was
based on its perception of a temporary need for extraordinary
measures to correct undeniable past wrongs. The Court focused on
groups only to allow private action that would help remedy widespread but concededly individual discrimination. 5 Segregated ta-

GROSSMAN, supra note 46, at 290-92, may be explained by a common principle: the law will

be accommodated to "the prevailing heterosexual ethic of American society." Rutherglen,
supra note 4, at 206. This rationale is also inapplicable to actuarial tables.
goLaffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 773-74, 790 (D.D.C. 1973), afl'd
on other grounds, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
" Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1977).
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
9SId. at 209 (footnote omitted).
" But see Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (applying a similar rule to sex
under equal protection analysis); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (same); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (same).
5The Weber remedy is novel; the Supreme Court has authorized judicially imposed
remedies only for individually identifiable victims of discrimination. See International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 356-77 (1977). Nevertheless, the Court plainly
viewed the quota in Weber as a remedy of sorts. The Court found it necessary to take
judicial notice that blacks had been excluded from craft unions, 443 U.S. at 198 n.1, and it
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bles, however, are not offered as a temporary group remedy for
past individual discrimination.
Finally, some of Manhart's critics have suggested that the
Bennett amendment authorizes disparate treatment in order to
avoid disparate impact.96 We have already demonstrated that this
analysis is unsound.9 7 If the Bennett amendment were so construed, an employer could justify paying men more than women
simply by demonstrating an association between sex and some
other variable he could legitimately seek to measure; the discrimination would then be based on some "factor other than sex."
2. Proposalsfor a New Exception. If actuarial tables are to
be exempted from Title VII's prohibition of disparate treatment, a
new exception must be created. Proposals for such an exception
have been based on the fact that longevity cannot be known in
advance and therefore must be predicted, e" or on related ideas
such as the nature of insurance.99 But these proposals must be rejected because they are inconsistent with the policies underlying
Title VII and because they cannot be distinguished from suggestions that forbidden criteria be used to predict a wide range of
other employment variables.
a. The Policies Underlying Title VIL Proponents of an exception must do more than merely point to some conceivable distinction between using sex to predict longevity and using sex to
predict other employment variables such as weight-lifting ability.
A legal distinction must remain consonant with the policies underlying the prohibition of disparate treatment.
Race, color, sex, religion, and national origin share three characteristics that justify the restrictions on their use.100 First, they
emphasized that its holding authorized efforts to "eliminate," "abolish," and "correct"
"traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy" and "conspicuous racial imbalance
in traditionally segregated job categories." Id. at 204-09 (footnote omitted). See also B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 46, at 1199-1221 (collecting cases in which lower courts
imposed quota remedies); id. at 332-33 (Supp. 1979) (same).
98 See City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 712-13; id. at 727 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
' See text and notes at notes 47-66 supra.
,8 City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 728 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Kimball, supra note 4, at 118-20.
"TIAA-CREF Comments, supra note 3, at 27.
The legislative history of Title VII reflects the view that discrimination on the basis
of forbidden criteria is especially unfair and morally reprehensible. The consensus was
broader with respect to race than sex, but the majority included sex in the list of forbidden
criteria. Scholars have undertaken to identify the reasons for the widespread view that discrimination on the basis of these criteria is especially suspect. That literature is now well
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are ascriptive'0 1 and immutable. 10 2 Second, they have been widely
misused throughout history.103 Third, they are generally irrelevant
to employment decisions.104 That is, race, color, sex, religion, and

national origin are almost never of legitimate interest to an employer for their own sake; at most, these criteria are statistically
associated with characteristics legitimately relevant to employment
decisions, and the associations are generally thought to be rather
10 5

weak.

These characteristics of the forbidden criteria interact to make
classifications based on them particularly offensive. Immutability
gives rise to a special sense of unfairness, for the victim can never
escape discrimination by her own efforts. Immutability also means
that members of dominant groups are not restrained by the fear
106
that they will some day become members of a minority group.
The history of widespread discrimination aggravates the victims' inability to escape and imposes cumulative disadvantage on
them. Moreover, persistent discrimination and the attitudes that
underlie it stigmatize the victims and create resentment against
any use of the criteria. Thus, even arguably legitimate uses may
aggravate the cumulative disadvantage and impose the same painful sense of victimization, unfair treatment, and frustration.
The irrelevance of the forbidden criteria has two implications.
Even when sex is strongly associated with a job qualification, at
least some members of both sexes are qualified. And because the
associations between forbidden criteria and job qualifications are
generally weak, little predictive power is lost by telling employers
developed, and there is consensus concerning the elements of the explanation, although
there are differences in emphasis. See, e.g., Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term-Foreword:In Defense of the Anti-DiscriminationPrinciple,90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 612 (1976); Fiss, A Theory of FairEmployment Laws, 38 U. CI. L. RE V. 235, 240-44 (1971);
Underwood, supra note 5, at 1434-36.
101 Ascriptive characteristics are those over which the individual has no control, usually
because of the accident of birth.
101 At least, they are immutable at any cost society is willing to coerce. It is no answer
to tell people they may avoid further discrimination only by undergoing religious conversions, sex-change operations, or racial disguises. On the importance of immutability, see
Brest, supra note 100, at 10; Fiss, supra note 100, at 241-43.
103 See Brest, supra note 100, at 7-8, 10; Fiss, supra note 100, at 242 n.11.
104 See Brest, supra note 100, at 6-7, 10; Fiss, supra note 100, at 241.
105 If the statistical associations between forbidden and legitimate criteria were frequently strong, the argument against creating exceptions would be strengthened, because
disparate treatment was forbidden despite these associations.
106 Men are disadvantaged when segregated tables are applied to life insurance. Women, however, are clearly net losers when both life insurance and annuities are considered.
See note 114 infra.
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not to use these criteria at all.
These characteristics of the forbidden criteria make all uses of
them suspect and have led to the ban on even arguably legitimate
uses. Consider the weight-lifting example. When an employer refuses to hire women because of their lower average weight-lifting
ability, he may be acting neutrally and efficiently. It may be much
more expensive to administer weight-lifting tests than to reject all
women;10 7 the convenience of using sex may make up for its crudeness as a predictor. Such a defense would be difficult for a trier of
fact to assess; the necessary economic data 08 and the employer's
actual motive would both be elusive. The employer might be maximizing wealth, indulging a taste for discrimination, or making a
rough judgment about efficiency with either a predisposition to resolve uncertainties in favor of not hiring women or an insensitivity
to the costs to women of not hiring them.
Even if the employer could demonstrate that he was pursuing
his self-interest and not acting irrationally, the harmful consequences of using a forbidden criterion would remain. Women who
could lift the weights but were forever denied the opportunity to
demonstrate that ability would feel victimized, and the cumulative
disadvantage imposed on such women would be increased. Both
the psychic costs to the victims and the distributional consequences are irrelevant to the profit-maximizing employer, but
quite relevant to the congressional policy against disparate
treatment. 101
There will always be a strong tendency to use forbidden criteria because they are convenient and cheap to administer. 110 But
107 Even a simple test such as lifting a stated weight a single time would cost something
to administer. But a much more sophisticated test would be necessary. See Bowe v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969).
108 A judge would need to know the cost of using some other predictor, the number of
qualified workers erroneously excluded by each predictor, the number of unqualified workers erroneously hired because of each predictor, and the costs of each kind of error. Some of
the costs would be indirect; for example, exclusion of qualified workers, at least in theory,

should raise the employer's costs. See G.

BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION

39-42

(2d ed. 1971). The cost of such analysis would overwhelm the savings that are the primary
advantage of using sex in the first place.
109 Psychic costs to the victim are a real cost, compensable in damages under some civil
rights acts. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 260-64 (1978); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 46, at 1259. Congress had redistributive goals for Title VII; it hoped that a policy
of equal treatment of individuals would improve the economic lot of disadvantaged groups.
See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-04 (1979).
110 It has been suggested that the cost savings of using forbidden criteria as predictors
may account for most discrimination in the United States today. See Phelps, The Statisti-

Sex Discrimination in Insurance

1980]

because they are such crude predictors, the benefits of using them
are outweighed by the costs to victims, the perceived unfairness of
those costs, and the prophylactic advantages of eliminating a defense that would be easy to assert and difficult to litigate.111 Even
Professor Posner, a leading proponent of free-market solutions, has
concluded that efficiency cannot be allowed as a defense to a
112
charge of disparate treatment.

These reasons for forbidding classifications based on sex are
fully applicable to insurance plans. Sex is still immutable; no woman can ever obtain the male rates, regardless of her own health or
other indicators of life expectancy. Segregated annuity tables aggravate the cumulative disadvantage imposed on women, whose
annuities are generally based on smaller lifetime earnings.118 Segregated life insurance tables do little to compensate. 4 Segregated
annuity tables also produce the frustration that results from discrimination based on an immutable characteristic.
There has also been a history of discrimination in insurance,
however "discrimination" is defined. 11 5 It is common for employers
cal Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972); Posner, The De Funis
Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup.
CT. REV. 1, 9, 21; Stiglitz, Approaches to the Economics of Discrimination,63 AM. EcoN.
REV. PAPERS & PRoc. 287, 292-94 (1973). See also D. GORDON, THEORIES OF POVERRTY AND

46 (1972).
" The Supreme Court has not been presented with an efficiency or administrative-

UNDEREMPLOYMENT

convenience defense to sex discrimination under Title VII. But it has rejected such defenses
in equal protection cases. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 100 S. Ct. 1540, 1545-47
(1980).
112 Posner, supra note 110, at 9-15. Professor Posner notes:
To say that discrimination is often a rational and efficient form of behavior is not
to say that it is socially or ethically desirable. "Efficient" must never be confused with
"good" or "right."
[A] policy against hostile discrimination ... if it is to be effective, requires
rejection of administrative convenience as a justification ....
Id. at 11, 15.
3 Women's periodic pension benefits have been about half those of men. See Lines,
supra note 44, at 491; Thompson, Pension Coverage and Benefits, 1972: Findingsfrom the
Retirement History Study, Soc. SEcunrrY BULL., Feb. 1978, at 3, 13.
11' An annuity can cost more than sixteen times as much as any other form of insurance
benefit program. Hearings in the Matter of OFCC Sex DiscriminationGuidelines, Section
60-20.3(c) Before the Employment Standards Administration of the Dept. of Labor (pt. 1)
155 (testimony of Robert H. Duncan, Executive Vice-President of TIAA-CREF), quoted in
Note, Sex Discriminationin Employee Fringe Benefits, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 109, 131
n.133 (1975). See also text at notes 116-117 infra.
115

U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORrES AND WOMEN IN

(1978). For accounts of discrimination in the availability of coverage, see Bailey, Hutchison & Narber, The Regulatory ChalPENSIONS AND HEALTH, LIFE, AND DISABILITY INSURANcE
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to pay men larger annuities because of their shorter life expectancy
but simultaneously to require women to purchase life insurance at
the same price as men. 116 There is evidence that even where segregated tables are used for both life insurance and annuities, the annuity setback is inflated as compared to the life insurance setback,
victimizing women with a more subtle double standard.1 7 This latter practice can be difficult to detect and prove. With the potential
for such abuse, courts could never simply take the insurance industry's word concerning proper rates. If segregated tables were permitted, there would be complex trials on whether the difference in
male and female rates was the precise amount justified by the
shifting association between sex and mortality." 8 Indeed, one author who thinks Manhart wrong in principle ultimately concludes
that it is right because no other rule is workable.1 1 9
Finally, sex is irrelevant to longevity in the Title VII sense: it
does not predict longevity in individual cases, and is a crude predictor even for groups. Both men and women die at all ages, over a

lenge in Life Insurance Classification, 25 DRAKE L. REV. INS. L. ANN. 779, 796-98 (1976);
Gillooly, The Developing Issue of Sex Discriminationin Insurance-An Overview, 23 AM.
LIFE INS. COUNSEL PROC.

261, 319-25 (1975).

16 See City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 n.10 (1978); Key, supra note
5, at 21; Lines, supra note 44, at 489, 521; Benefits, Perquisites and Special Services for
Faculty Members of The University of Chicago 4-5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BENEFITS]
(on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
117 It is common to use three-year setbacks for life insurance and six-year setbacks for
annuities. Kimball, supra note 4, at 109. Since the difference in life expectancy as predicted
by segregated tables is greatest at birth and gradually decreases with age, this is backwards.
For example, at age 30, a common age for buying life insurance, the difference in the United
States in 1977 was 6.8 years; at age 65, a common age to begin collecting an annuity, the

difference was 4.4 years. 2

NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HEALTH, ED-

1977, sec. 5, at 5-9 (1980).
Insured lives are not so different as to reverse this relationship. R. DUNCAN, TIAA FEMALE
MORTALITY EXPERIENCE 1965-1970 (1972) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review); SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, 1973 MORTALITY REPORTS 225-27 (1973), reprinted in U.S.
COMM'N ON CiviL RIGHTS, supra note 115, at 546-49; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Sex Differentials in Mortality, STATISTICAL BULL., Aug. 1974, at 3, 4. Three-year life insurance setbacks have been criticized as inadequate even by some insurance companies. Gillooly, supra
note 115, at 326-27.
118 Quite apart from any double standard, current tables probably overstate the female
advantage in the generations currently working. See text and notes at notes 240-267 infra.
Such claims would be fruitful ground for litigation unless the courts abdicated to the insurance industry and held that sexual equality need not be achieved with any precision for
either groups or individuals. That such trials did not occur before Manhart is no basis for
predicting that they would not occur if Manhart were overruled. Only if segregated tables
were established in principle would litigators' attention turn to the details of their
operation.
119 Rutherglen, supra note 4, at 248-56.
UCATION & WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES,
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range of more than one hundred years; the difference in expectation of life at birth is about eight years. 120 More than eighty percent of all female deaths can be matched with a contemporaneous
male death. 211 Thus, knowing a person's sex tells very little about
when he will die-probably
less than it tells about how much
122

weight he can lift.

The predictive power of sex is further diminished by the enormous variation in the association between sex and mortality over
time, space, environment, and personal behavior. 123 Insurance rates
are calculated from mortality tables based on persons already
dead, 2 4 and charged to persons who will live far into the future.
Thus there is no reason to expect sex differences among current
25
insureds to match those reflected in the tables.

Sex is also irrelevant in a related sense: much of the association between sex and mortality is spurious. That is, much of the
association is accounted for by intervening variables, such as smoking or other self-destructive behavior. 2 6 More men than women
supra note 6, at 70.
Bergmann & Gray, Equality in Retirement Benefits: The Need for Pension Reform,
CIv. RIGHTS DIG., Fall 1975, at 25, 25; Kimball, supra note 4, at 121.
12 Experts of the International Labor Organization have recommended weight-lifting
limits for males that exceed those for females by 57% to 100%. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 416 F.2d 711, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1969). Average differences in longevity are much smaller.
See note 183 infra.
120 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
1M1

123

See part II infra.

See text and notes at notes 180-182 infra.
It might be argued that if sex is such a poor predictor, the competitive market
would have long since eliminated its use. See Kimball, supra note 4, at 135-36 (semble).
But the market has not even eliminated the most blatant form of discrimination, the use of
segregated tables for annuities and integrated tables for life insurance. See text and note at
note 116 supra. Such market failures are not surprising. Competition is dulled because it is
enormously difficult for consumers to compare the terms, or even the prices, of annuity and
life insurance contracts. The quoted rate is often a conservative guarantee, with the actual
rate depending upon dividends or additional interest credited from time to time in light of
experience. See Belth, Life Insurance Price Measurement, 57 Ky. L.J. 687, 705-10 (1969);
Palmer, Illustrated and Realized Policyowner Dividends: An Empirical Analysis, 43 J.
RISK & INS. 653 (1976). One commentator suggests that consumers' inability to compare
products has contributed to a low rate of innovation in the insurance industry. Dorfman,
The Theory and Practice of Innovation in the PrivateInsuranceIndustry: Comment, 45 J.
RISK & INS. 689 (1978). In employer-sponsored insurance plans, the only ones subject to
Title VII, competition is further dulled because the plan is selected by the employer, whose
only incentive is to satisfy the majority of his employees at the least cost. If the majority of
employees are male, the market incentive is to cater to them by selecting segregated annuity
tables and integrated life insurance tables. See also Bergmann & Gray, supra note 121, at
26.
126 See text and notes at notes 243-251 infra. One scholar concluded: "[O]lder males in
Western countries have only themselves to blame for a deteriorating mortality position." S.
124

126
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tend to engage in such behavior, thus raising male death rates. But
the explanatory variable is the behavior, not sex.
It might seem that spuriousness is unimportant, because if the
difference in life expectancy at birth is eight years, we ought still
to predict that any two individuals Wvho were identical except for
sex would have an eight-year difference in longevity. But this inference is statistically fallacious. This is most easily demonstrated
where the association is wholly spurious, in which case we ought to
predict identical longevity for two individuals who differ only by
sex. The reason is that by choosing to compare these identical men
and women, we have controlled for the true causal variables. Professor Kimball is therefore wrong when he argues that "[m]any a
man would be glad to trade places [with women]. The probability
of several extra years of life would be attractive to most men, even
at cost of the tradeoff of longer life for smaller periodic benefits. ' 127 A change of sex that is not accompanied by a change in
any other variables will have no effect whatever on life expectancy
unless sex, per se, has a causative role. Professor Kimball has made
the classic mistake of confusing correlation with causation.2 8
Segregated tables are thus particularly offensive where, as
here, we have reason to believe the association is largely spurious,
although the basic statutory prohibition would apply even if this
were not the case. This argument holds even in situations where
the association is only partly spurious, because segregated insurance tables attribute the entire difference to sex. The unfairness is
even more acute where, as here, the true causative variables are
(Univ. of Cal. Population Monograph No. 7, 1970).
127 Kimball, supra note 4, at 123. A similar fallacy apparently underlies Chief Justice
Burger's otherwise incomprehensible argument that "categorizing people on the basis of sex
. . .is to take into account all of the unknown reasons, whether biologically or culturally
based, or both, which give women a significantly greater life expectancy than men." City of
Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 727 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This assumes that all of the real predictors of mortality affect every member of a sex equally, which is obviously not true.
12 The mischief such confusion can cause is amply illustrated by a well known study of
applications to University of California at Berkeley graduate schools. A higher percentage of
male applications were successful. This seemed at first to be evidence of bias; on closer
examination, however, the authors found that the reason for the differential was that men
tended to apply to those departments that admitted a higher percentage of applicants. Bickel, Hammel & O'Connell, Is There a Sex Bias in Graduate Admissions: Data from Berkeley, 187 SCIENCE 398 (1975). Just as with higher male mortality (where men steer themselves
into high risk categories), women were directing themselves into high risk admissions pools.
In both cases, people tend to the same erroneous conclusion: that it is sex, per se, that
makes all the difference.
PRESTON, MALE MORTALITY AND CIGARETTE SMOKING 100
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self-induced destructive behavior, for no man need "trade places"
with a woman in order to increase his longevity. Not only would
that be pointless, as argued above, it would also be unnecessary,
since the way to increase life expectancy is by not indulging in
smoking or other self-destructive behavior. Under segregated actuarial tables, a man may enjoy a long life and receive larger periodic
benefits at the same time, simply by not engaging in those activities that have caused other men to die prematurely. Women, obviously, do not have this option because their benefits are fixed at
the lower female level.
Because the three characteristics that justify the ban on disparate treatment-immutability, irrelevance, and historic discrimination-are applicable in the context of actuarial tables, creation of
an actuarial exception would run afoul of the fundamental principle underlying the statute.
b.

The Argument from Necessity. Some proponents of segre-

gated tables nevertheless argue that the statutory policy cannot
sensibly be applied to employment criteria that must be predicted
in advance and that cannot be measured directly.1 29 This too is a
distinction without a difference. Mortality can be predicted by
considering all humans as a single group, or by using a wide variety
of unforbidden classifying criteria.130 Many of these predictors are
"'

Kimball, supra note 4, at 118-20; King, supra note 9, at 557.

ISO

Weight, physical build, physical condition, personal and family history, occupation,

habits, aviation or military service, residence, and hobbies are commonly used in the sale of

individual life insurance. S.

HUEBNER

& K.

BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE

364-68 (9th ed. 1976).

Some companies are now using smoking, exercise, and physical fitness. Kimball, supra note
4, at 119 n.96; Yenkel, Exercising to Ensure Health Can Save on Life Insurance, Chi. SunTimes, Sept. 4, 1979, at 41, col. 1. Mortality varies widely by marital status. M. CARTER & P.
GLICK, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY 340-42 (rev. ed. 1976); E.
KITAGAWA &

P.

HAUSER, DIFFERENTIAL MORTALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 105

(1973); Gove,

Sex, Marital Status, and Mortality, 79 AM. J. Soc. 45 (1973). Mortality varies with most
socioeconomic indicators including education, E. KITAGAWA & P. HAUSER, supra, at 72, and
occupation, id. at 34-46; Logan, Social Class Variations in Mortality, in DEMOGRAPHIC
ANALYSIS 138 (J. Spengler & 0. Duncan eds. 1956); Martin, A Comparison of Trends of
Male and Female Mortality, 114 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC'Y (SERIES A) 287, 297-98 (1951);
Pressat, Surmortalit6 Biologique et SurmortalitN Sociale, 14 REVUE FRANqAISE DE SOCIOLOGIE (Numero Special) 103, 108-09 (1973). Geographic mortality differences in the United
States are greater than sex mortality differences, see text and notes at notes 215-217 infra,

as are marital status mortality differences among men, R. RETHERFORD, THE CHANGING SEX
DIFFERENTIAL IN MORTALITY 91-93 (1975), and education mortality differences among women, E. KITAGAWA & P. HAUSER, supra, at 16-17, 203-04. See also Anderson, supra note 34,
at 5. We express no opinion on whether these predictors should be used. Some may be good
predictors; some may be too costly, or subject to policy objections, or based on spurious
associations. It should also be noted that using all of these predictors in addition to sex
would not legitimate the use of sex. No matter how many predictors were used, every sub-
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more expensive to use than sex, but so is a weight-lifting test; the
difference, if there is one, is a matter of degree.
The use of sex as a predictor of longevity would be improper
even if it were the only available predictor: sex would still be immutable, subject to abuse, and a weak predictor. Thus, courts have
refused to allow the use of sex to predict immeasurable intangibles.
In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,131 for example, the
court let stand findings that sex was the best single predictor of
ability to satisfy passengers' emotional needs on airplane flights,
and that there was no way to measure this ability directly. Even so,
Pan Am's policy of hiring only women was held to be illegal disparate treatment.
Any other rule would seriously weaken the statute, for many
job skills cannot be measured directly or predicted reliably, especially for new entrants to the labor force. Indeed, much of the work
of industrial psychology is devoted to predicting and evaluating job
qualifications, and for complex jobs the problems of evaluating
even incumbents are enormously difficult.3 2 No hiring officer can
consistently predict absenteeism, turnover, persistence, reliability,
creative genius, courage, or judgment with much accuracy in individual cases, and employers may frequently be able to adduce
some evidence that these traits have statistical associations with
sex or race.1 83 Such defenses would be easy to assert and difficult
to litigate. Most important, such defenses would violate the fundamental principles of the Act, by permitting employers to penalize,
solely because of their sex, individuals for whom the prediction is
inaccurate.
A variation of the necessity argument is that insurance pools
must take account of known differences in risk to the extent justified by the cost of doing so, and that failure to do so creates subsidies between groups, followed by efforts to withdraw from the pool
and consequent inefficiencies.13 4 At most, this is a special case of
category would include persons who differed only by sex.
11 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
'32 Lerner, supra note 80, at 279-92.

M'The authoritative work on sex differences is E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES (1974). They found that many popular beliefs about sex differences have "little or no basis in fact." Id. at 355. But on almost every point there are conflicting studies on which an employer could rely, and with respect to some variables, the
weight of the evidence points to associations with sex. See id. at 162-63, 227-74, 349-74.
"' See Kimball, supra note 4, at 106-08, 134-35; Rothschild & Stiglitz, Equilibrium in
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90
Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976).
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the argument that sex discrimination is sometimes economically
efficient. The efficiency results, if at all, from the same facts that
make sex an arguably efficient predictor in other contexts: that it
has a little predictive power and is almost costless to use. That
justification for disparate treatment is no more acceptable in the
1 35
insurance context than in any other.
Nor are the possible inefficiencies particularly intolerable in
the insurance industry. Very few employer-sponsored insurance
plans use any predictors other than age and sex; se most do not use
sex,1 7 and some do not even use age. ' All other predictors are
ignored, and the resulting inter-group subsidies tolerated, because
using the predictor costs more than it is worth, 13 9 is socially unacceptable, 40 or is illegal.1 Ignoring these predictors has not, however, produced an exodus of participants from these pools, because
there are so many advantages to staying in,1 42 there are restrictions
on withdrawal, 43 and perhaps for other reasons. 4 There is little
reason to expect that greater problems will result from full en145
forcement of the ban on sex as a predictor.
See text and notes at notes 107-112 supra.
' See Anderson, supra note 34, at 5, 7; Key, supra note 5, at 12; Kimball, supra note
4, at 107-08, 118-20; King, supra note 9, at 565.
137 43 Fed. Reg. 38,029, 38,030 (1978) (reporting findings of hearings held by Department of Labor in 1974).
131 See, e.g., BENEFITS, supra note 116, at 4-5.
,3,See Kimball, supra note 4, at 107-09, 119-20.
14 See RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 33, at 20-21.
m See Bailey, Hutchison & Narber, supra note 115, at 793-801; Gordon, The AntiDiscriminationLaws-A Survey of the Development and Enforcement-1900-1950, 1950
AM. LIFE CONVENTION LEGAL SECTION PROC. 34, 37-38, 47; Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A PreliminaryInquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV.
471, 496 (1961).
"I Savings in administrative costs, tax benefits, rights to transfer annuity contracts
from one employer to another, the need for the highest possible current income, the need to
provide for survivors, or a general preference to avoid or accept risk may outweigh the desire to play the statistical odds on mortality in selection of plans and payment options. See
Key, supra note 5, at 20-25.
,4 Participation in employer-sponsored plans is often mandatory. There are tax disadvantages to lump sum settlements, and some plans preclude them-for example, TIAACREF (contract on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
144 Some insureds may be unaware of the associations between mortality and their personal characteristics. Some may put little faith in statistical generalizations, or think themselves immune from the odds.
145 Some of the predictors not currently used make as big an apparent difference as sex,
see note 130 supra, although the associations are not as well known. Even Professor Kimball
acknowledges that sexually integrated tables involve few technical problems when used voluntarily. Kimball, supra note 4, at 133. But he claims that making integrated tables
mandatory creates incentives not to hire women, variations in the rate for the pool if its
M
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c. The Competing Analogies of Race and Age. Another way
to consider the proposed actuarial exception to Title VII is to examine the treatment of analogous predictors of mortality. The majority in Manhart analogized sex to race.1 4 There is near consensus that race should not be used as a predictor in insurance, 147 and
many state insurance laws ban its use. 148 In contrast, some proponents of segregated tables analogize sex to age; there is consensus
149
that age can be used to predict mortality.
Congress plainly has decided that sex is more like race. Except
for some differences in defenses1 50 and a separate section on pregnancy,25 . racial and sexual discrimination are forbidden in identical terms in the same clause of the same statute. Those who argue
for different meanings of "discriminate" on the basis of race and
on the basis of sex are quarrelling with the statute, not interpret-

sexual composition changes, and incentives for men to elect settlements or guarantees and
women to elect annuities. Id. at 133-35. See also King, supra note 9, at 562-63. But all of
these problems-to the extent they are problems-would be equally true of voluntarily integrated plans; Professor Kimball does not explain why making integration mandatory would
aggravate them. His projections about what might happen under integrated tables are less
credible than his concession that integrated tables have worked, Kimball, supra note 4, at
133. See also City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716 n.30. Professor Kimball also
predicts that employers with a largely male work force will withdraw from multi-employer
pools, so that ultimately, portability will be lost to the "immense disadvantage" of both men
and women. Kimball, supra note 4, at 134-35. But it is precisely the immense disadvantage
of losing portability that makes it unlikely to occur. See Key, supra note 5, at 20-25. Some
members of the insurance community agree that integrated tables will work. See MASSACHUsETTs

DIvISION OF INSURANCE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

CURACY

RISK

CLASSIFICATIONS: EQUITY AND

Ac-

144-205 (1978); Anderson, supra note 34, at 7; Kent, Sex and Other Underwriting

Discriminations,LIFE

INS. SELLING,

Mar. 1979, at 6.

,46 435 U.S. at 709.
147 See RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 33, at 21; Kimball, supra note
141, at 496;
Kimball, supra note 4, at 111-13; Randall, Risk Classificationand Actuarial Tables as They
Affect Insurance Pricing for Women and Minorities, in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 115, at 527, 535-36, 607-08; Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 150. For dissenting

views, see

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, REPORT ON TASK FORCE ON RISK CLASSIFICA-

(1977), reprinted in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 115, at 577, 590-91;
Bailey, Hutchison & Narber, supra note 115, at 793 n.54. Not all of those who think that
race should not be used necessarily think that Title VII forbids its use. But they must at
least think that Title VII does not require its use.
148 Authorities cited note 141 supra.
149 Hedges, supra note 9, at 143; Kimball, supra note 4, at 123; King, supra note 9, at
TION

558-60; Myers, supra note 9, at 145.
150 There is no BFOQ defense to race discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). The
Bennett amendment, which incorporates the Equal Pay Act's provision that disparate impact in compensation is not illegal, does not apply to race. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
15- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1978).
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ing it. 152 Age, on the other hand, was excluded from Title VII for
fear that group insurance plans would be disrupted,15 s and later
included in a much less sweeping1 54 separate statute that specifically exempts insurance plans.1 55
These congressional choices are sound, given the policies underlying discrimination law. Age does not fully share with race and
sex the characteristics that make the latter types of discrimination
so offensive. Most individuals can control when they buy life insurance or begin collecting an annuity; no one can control his race or
sex. Age discrimination arguably has been less pervasive and unidirectional than sex discrimination: sometimes the young are discriminated against and sometimes the old.1 5. Finally, the association between age and mortality is much stronger than that between
sex and mortality. After early childhood, age-specific death1 57rates
increase almost uniformly with age until they approach one; put
another way, each year of life uses up a year of the maximum
human life span.
The analogy between sex and race is much stronger. Three arguments have been offered to distinguish the two. First, it has been
suggested that blacks have been more abused than women. 158 We

152 The stock counter-example is segregated restrooms, but the different treatment of
race and sex with respect to restrooms results from a difference in facts rather than a different construction of the statute. Separate but equal facilities are discriminatory only if the
segregation stigmatizes. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (interpreting the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980).
Racially segregated restrooms stigmatize blacks, but sexually segregated restrooms stigmatize no one. See also text and notes at notes 88-91 supra.
:'3 See 110 CONG. REc. 13490-92 (1964).
'4 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. II
1978) ("ADEA"), is fundamentally different from Title VII. Title VII generally forbids racial, sexual, religious, and ethnic classifications. The ADEA forbids only some age classifications, and actually makes one of its own: workers are protected only between the ages of 40
and 70. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. II 1978).
29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1976).
156 The disabilities of youth, such as those with respect to voting, driving, drinking, and
contracting, are a form of age discrimination, widely thought to be justifiable. The unemployment and underemployment rates among young workers have far exceeded the rates
among older workers protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; discrimination against older workers did not produce cumulative disadvantage comparable to that reflected in such rates for women and blacks. See T. SULLIVAN, MARGINAL WORKERS, MARGINAL JOBS 75-79, 84-85, 96-97, 103, 106-07 (1978).
157 There is currently a small "bulge" in the age-specific mortality rates of young men
in their early twenties, but this bulge can be removed by controlling for violent deaths and
motor vehicle accidents. Bayo, Discussion of Preceding Paper, 28 TRANSACTIONS Soc'Y AcTUARIES 117 (1976).
'18 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
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find that unpersuasive. 15 More importantly, the claim that women
have been so much less victimized that sex discrimination deserves
more tolerance calls for a classically political judgment, and Congress has rejected the claim. 16 0
The second proffered distinction between race and sex is that
it is more difficult to classify by race. 16 Yet insurers did use racesegregated tables until the practice was banned, 6 2 and a careful
study of data quality has found that racial identification is not a
problem in mortality research. 6 3 Apart from its implausibility, the
argument is not responsive to the reasons
for banning disparate
64
treatment; efficiency is not a defense.
Finally, it has been suggested that the association between
race and mortality is environmental or social, but that that between sex and mortality is genetic. 1 5 Even if the claim were true,
no one has plausibly explained why it justifies using sex as a predictor: women are shorter than men for what are probably genetic
J.); Kimball, supra note 4, at 113 n.82; Rutherglen, supra note 4, at 205-12.
"I In employment, the focus of Title VII, women have fared worse than blacks in some
ways and better in others. Black men are more likely to be unemployed than white women,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 396, but they are much better paid when they work.
Among full-time year-round workers, the median earnings of white women are only $9,732,
compared to $12,530 for black men and $16,360 for white men. Black women earn least of
all, with a median of $9,020. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS
SERIES P-60, No. 120, MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE
UNITED STATES:

1978

(ADVANCE REPORT)

18-19 (1979). Work patterns and levels of job quali-

fication do not explain the earnings differential; in fact, employed women have substantially

more education than employed blacks.

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,

supra note 6, at 398. At

equivalent levels of education, both black and white women earn less than black men. U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN

22-24

(1978). Even when occupational prestige, age, weeks worked, hours worked last week, and
average income in the state of residence are controlled in addition to education, the earnings
predicted in a regression equation show a comparable gap between black men and black or
white women, id. at.53-54. The rate of return to education is also lower for all women and
for career women, as compared to black men. Suter & Miller, Income Differences Between
Men and Career Women, 78 AM. J. Soc. 962, 970-71 (1973).
160 Congress chose to treat sexual and racial discrimination identically in 1964, and a
congressional committee spoke directly to the issue during consideration of the 1972 amendments to Title VII. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971), reprinted in [1972]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2141.
'e Kimball, supra note 4, at 111-13.
162 See J. MAGEE, LIFE INSURANCE 522 (rev. ed.
's' E. KITAGAWA & P. HAUSER, supra note 130,

1951).
at 95.

164 See text and notes at notes 107-112 supra. Professor Kimball has argued that "fundamental moral notions about equal treatment of the races" preclude taking race into
account. Kimball, supra note 141, at 496. Such fundamental moral notions do not depend
on difficulties of classification.

165 Kimball,

supra note 4, at 111-13. See

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES,

supra note

147, at 590-91; Kimball, supra note 141, at 496; Randall, supra note 147, at 535-37.
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reasons. Regardless of its causes, the association between sex and
mortality is weak and unstable; calling the association genetic does
not make sex a better predictor.""6 In any event, those who would
recognize a genetic-difference exception to the ban on disparate
treatment must bear the burden of proving that the difference is
really genetic. In fact, the claim that sex differences in mortality
are largely explained by genetic differences is simply wrong.
II.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS

Legal scholars on both sides of the Manhart controversy are
inclined to assume that permanently lower female mortality is a
simple fact: women live longer than men.6 7 The exact difference
cited varies from five to ten years.1 8 Such writers suggest- explicitly or implicitly-that, this difference is stable and will remain
true for the present generation of insureds16 9 Some proponents of
segregated tables go even further, claiming that sex mortality differences ("SMDs") are nearly universal, and largely genetic in
166 It has been suggested that if sex mortality differences are genetic, sex itself is actually a predictor of mortality and not just a surrogate for the true factors, Kimball, supra
note 4, at 112, and that sex can therefore be used as a predictor under such circumstances
without indulging a sexual stereotype, Halperin & Gross, Sex Discriminationand Pensions:
Are We Moving Towards Unisex Tables?, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIvERsITY 30rH

ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR

235, 249 (R. Adelman ed. 1977). A similar position

is taken in Kimball, supra note 141, at 496. But this is demonstrably not true. One known
genetic difference between the sexes, related to mortality, is that males are far more likely
than females to be hemophiliacs. But only a few males are at risk, only some of those actually have the disease, and these individuals can be identified. Thus, sex is not the "true
factor" in shortened life from hemophilia, and to treat all males as hemophiliacs would be a
"sexual stereotype," even though hemophilia is a sex-linked genetic trait. To claim that sex
itself is a predictor of mortality, and not merely a surrogate, proponents of segregated tables
must explore each genetic or biological difference and show that it affects all members of a
sex and is not merely associated with sex. Even if some genetic or biological factor were
shown to affect every member of a sex, it would do so only marginally; sex still would not
predict longevity for individuals, and would still predict weakly for groups.
"' See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978); id. at 724 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 726 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Bailey, Hutchison & Narber, supra note 115, at 787; Bernstein & Williams, supra note 44, at
1203; Gerber, supra note 9, at 1218, 1230; Gold, supra note 44, at 597 & n.5; Gold, Of Giving
and Taking: Applications and Implications of City of Los Angeles, Department of Water
and Power v. Manhart, 65 VA. L. REv. 663, 699 (1979).
16" See, e.g., Sowell, Status Versus Behavior, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 180 (ten years);
Comment, Equal Protection, Title VII, and Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 13 TULSA L.J.
338, 341 (1977) (five years); Note, supra note 114, at 130 (seven years).
169 See, e.g., Bernstein & Williams, supra note 44, at 1207; Kimball, supra note 4, at

The University of Chicago Law Review

[47:505

origin. 170
Even if true, these claims would not change our view of the
statute. 17 1 But they are crucial to the conclusions of some proponents of segregated tables. The importance of these claims is
stated most clearly and forcefully by Professor Kimball. He writes
that racial mortality differences are social and environmental
rather than genetic: "Thus, mortality tables based on a race classification will reflect accurately only past experience under social
conditions now in rapid flux. They have little predictive value for
new conditions. Race is only an inaccurate surrogate for the true
factors and has no demonstrable effect in itself.' ' 7 2 By contrast, he
argues that SMDs are primarily biological, and, by implication, important in themselves and useful for predicting the future. 7 3 His
evidence for the genetic origin of SMDs is that "better female mortality experience is an almost universal phenomenon."' 17 4
In fact, the female advantage is not "almost universal." The
present female advantage in the United States is largely explained
by environmental and behavioral factors that are subject to rapid
change-so much so that SMDs have varied even more than racial
mortality differences. 75 Thus, consistency requires the admission
that sex, like race, is "wholly indefensible on factual grounds" as a
17 6
predictor of mortality.
This conclusion is so contrary to the conventional wisdom in
170 Gerber, supra note 9, at 1218-21; Gillooly, supra note 115, at 326; Hedges, supra
note 9, at 144; Kimball, supra note 4, at 113; Randall, supra note 147, at 536-37.
171 See text and note at note 166 supra.
172 Kimball, supra note 4, at 112. Similar arguments are made by Gerber, supra note 9,
at 1218-20; Randall, supra note 147, at 535-37.
173 Kimball, supra note 4, at 112-13.
'4 Id. at 113 n.81.
'
From 1920 to 1970, the SMD at birth in the United States increased 6.7 years or
670%, while the difference at birth between whites and nonwhites declined 3.2 years or
36%. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 70. Controlling for education, E. KITAGAWA &
P. HAUSER, supra note 130, at 167, or occupation, Bailey, Hutchison & Narber, supra note
115, at 793 n.54, does not eliminate the excess mortality recorded for blacks. The greater
reported life expectancy of elderly blacks, noted by Kimball, supra note 4, at 112, and
Lines, supra note 44, at 523 n.131, is thought to be an artifact of inaccurate and inadequate
data. E. KITAGAWA & P. HAUSER, supra note 130, at 93-98; M. SPIEGELMAN, INTRODUCTION TO
DEMOGRAPHY 63-65 (rev. ed. 1968); Bogue, Misra & Dandekar, A New Estimate of the Negro
Populationand Negro Vital Rates in the United States, 1930-1960, 1 DEMOGRAPHY 339, 354
(1964); Myers, Errors and Bias in the Reporting of Ages in Census Data, 41 TRANSACTIONS
ACTUARIAL Soc'y AM. 395, 399-400 (1940); Rosenwaike, A New Evaluation of United States
Census Data on the Extreme Aged, 16 DEMOGRAPHY 279, 286-87 (1979); Rosenwaike, On
Measuring the Extreme Aged in the Population,63 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 29, 40 (1968).
176 Kimball, supra note 4, at 113.
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the legal and insurance literature that it is likely to be greeted with
skepticism. But most empirical research on SMDs has been done
in other disciplines, and all major investigators now believe that
social, cultural, environmental, and behavioral factors are more important than genetic or biological factors in explaining SMDs. 1"7
We have synthesized this work, along with other sources of evidence, and the strength of the resulting conclusion may surprise
even some demographers. But for the most part, we are simply reporting to the legal profession the existing literature on SMDs.
A.

A Note on the Evidence

Two common mortality measures, the expectation of life and
the survival rate, are derived from an actuarial table called a life
table. The most commonly used table is a period or current life
table, which is based on a hypothetical cohort of babies, usually
100,000. It is assumed that all the babies were born alive at the
same instant and were subjected throughout their lives to the agespecific death rates actually observed in the general population
during a short period of time. 178 A 1980 period life table assumes
that babies born in 1980 will be subject to the 1980 mortality rates
for infants, and that when they are aged 20 (in 2000), they will be
subject to the mortality rates that affected 20-year-olds in 1980,
and so on. A statement that the expectation of life at birth in 1980
is 73 years means that the average remaining life time for all
100,000 babies would be 73 years. A statement that the survival
rate between ages 0 and 73 is .60 means that 60% of the 100,000
babies would survive to exact age 73, if the 1980 mortality conditions persisted unchanged.1 7
The life table cannot be constructed until age-specific death
rates have been computed.1 80 In practice, these rates are compiled
177

S. PRESTON, supra note 126, at 100; R. RETHERFORD, supra note 130, at 101; Enter-

line, Causes of Death Responsible for Recent Increases in Sex Mortality Differentials in
the United States, 39 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 312, 325 (1961); Pressat, supra note 130,
at 105; Waldron, Why Do Women Live Longer than Men?, 10 Soc. ScI. & MED. 349, 349
(1976).
178

See generally N.

KEYFITZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE MATHEMATICS OF POPULATION

3-19

(1968); 1 H. SHRYOCK & J. SIEGEL, METHODS AND MATERIALS OF DEMOGRAPHY 429-61 (2d
printing 1973).
179 These illustrations are close to current U.S. experience; the data are those actually

reported for 1977. 2

NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,

supra note 117, sec. 5, at 5-

9, 5-12. The life table survival rate is computed as the ratio of persons alive at age (x + n)
to the number alive at age x.
180 Some legal commentators are confused on this point. See Comment, supra note 168,
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by classifying death registrations by age at death and relating
them to the census population or estimated population of the same
age in the same year.181 The rates are converted into the
probability that a person reaching exact age x will not live to exact
age (x + n).
What is common to both life table measures and death rates is
that they are based on the experience of persons already dead,
with the assumption that these recent death data are an adequate
guide to the future. Because of the long-term trend of declining
mortality, life tables nearly always underestimate longevity and
age-specific death rates nearly always overestimate future mortality. SMDs are computed by comparing survival rates or life expectancies compiled separately for each sex; 182 the stated difference
depends on the measure that is used.18
B.

The Evidence for a Universal, Biological, Female Advantage

The primary evidence for the genetic origin of SMDs is the
claim that lower female mortality is almost universal. As Professor
Kimball summarizes: "Women have better mortality experience
than do men, at all ages from conception on, at all times during

at 339. The numerator of an age-specific death rate is deaths to persons aged x; the denominator is persons aged x in the population.
11 Many countries compile mortality data at long or irregular intervals. Thus, reliance
on scattered dates below does not mean that there are contrary data from other years.
182 Whenever sufficient data are available, demographers prefer to use sex-specific life
tables for technical reasons, but this does not imply that integrated tables are invalid. The
quality of the age data on which life tables are based is likely to differ by sex. See 1 U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE POPULATION, PART 1, UNITED STATES SUMMARY XXXiX (1964); Siegel, Estimates of Coverage of the Populationby Sex, Race, and Age in the 1970 Census, 11 DEMOGRAPHY 1 (1974);
Zelnick, Errors in the 1960 Census Enumeration of Native Whites, 59 J. Am. STATISTICAL
ASS'N 437 (1964). Estimates of the net reproduction rate require life table survival rates for
females only; other techniques require viewing the two sexes as if they were two populations
interacting, and this requires sex-specific tables. N. KEYPITZ, supra note 178, at 293-308; 1
H. SHRYOCK & J. SIEGEL, supra note 178, at 525-26. The study of SMDs, an important area
of mortality research, obviously requires data classified by sex. For a recent review, see Kitagawa, On Mortality, 14 DEMOGRAPHY 381, 384 (1977).
183 The importance of the SMD can be magnified or diminished by the choice of mortality measure, as the following table shows:
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this century, in almost all countries.""" Although it is true that
greater female longevity has been common in recent times, these
generalizations have too many exceptions to support an assertion
that SMDs are biologically or genetically based. We will consider
these generalizations in turn, and then review other variations in
SMDs.
1. "At All Ages from Conception on." The conventional
wisdom, even in demography textbooks, 185 has been that women
have lower death rates than men at all ages. A thorough review of
the literature, however, reveals important exceptions to this
generalization.
Early studies of aborted fetuses seemed to indicate that prenatal mortality was much higher for males than for females, and
that the earliest fetal deaths were the most disproportionately
male. This led to speculation that many more boys than girls were
conceived. Later investigators, armed with better techniques for
identifying fetal sex, concluded that "no excess mortality of males
during the previable period could be demonstrated."1 86 Thus the
evidence is inconsistent with the claim of female advantage "from

MALE-FEMALE DIFFERENCES IN SOME COMMON MORTALITY MEASURES, 1969-1971

Male

Female

67.04

74.64

7.60

67.58

74.97

7.39

12.99

16.83

3.84

Median age at deatha

71.87

79.88

8.01

Survival rate to age 50

86.1 %

91.9 %

Survival rate to age 65

64.3 %

79.7 %

Crude death rate b

10.9/1000

Difference

Expectation of life (ex)

at birth ( 0)
at age 1 ( 1 )
at age 65 (9 65 )

8.1/1000

5.8 %
15.4 %
2.8/1000

Taken or calculated from STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6; 1 U.S.
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, UNITED
SOURCE:

STATES LIFE TABLES,

1969-71 No. 4 (1975).

a The age at which one-half of the life table cohort of 100,000 babies would

be dead.
b The weighted average of age-specific death rates, customarily reported as
number of deaths per 1000.
U4 Kimball, supra note 4, at 113 (emphasis in original). Accord, Gerber, supra note 9,
at 1220.
185 E.g., W. PETERSEN, POPULATION 67, 223 (3d ed. 1975).
"'

Tietze, A Note on the Sex Ratio of Abortions, 20 HUMAN BIOLOGY 156, 159 (1948).
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187

Except for societies that practice female infanticide, either directly or through neglect, 188 it appears that death rates in the first
year of life are higher for males.8 9 Given the nearly universal preference for sons, 90 this mortality differential flies in the face of
probable social and cultural efforts to stem it, and may therefore
reflect a biological or genetic predisposition.
After the age of one year, higher female mortality was once
believed to exist only during the childbearing years in countries
with high fertility and high infant and maternal mortality. 1 ' More
recent studies dispute this. In his comprehensive review of the
data, Professor Stolnitz concluded:
The occurrence of higher male survival rates at some ages, far
from being comparatively rare, has in fact been usual over the
world during most of the last century. Indeed, for the decades
before 1920, the stronger statement seems justified that such
rates were also usual within each major region. Thus in the
West lower female mortality at all ages first became typical as
recently as the 1930's."'1
Higher female mortality was common not only in the reproductive
years, but in early and late childhood as well.9 3
Professor Preston extended the Stolnitz research. He found
These studies are reviewed by R. Retherford, Analysis of Trends in Sex Mortality
Differentials in Developed Countries 13 (1970) (Ph.D. dissertation, Sociology, University of
California at Berkeley). See also Waldron, supra note 177, at 349.
,' Female infanticide was practiced in Western Europe until about 1850. T. McKEOWN,
187

RisE OF POPULATION 47, 146-47 (1976); S. PRESTON, MORTALITY PATTERNS IN
NATIONAL POPULATIONS 147-48 (1976); Langer, Infanticide: A Historical Survey, 2 HIST.
CHLDHOOD Q. 353 (1974).
189 S. PRESTON, supra note 188, at 121. But a U.S. Census Bureau analysis found higher
female infant mortality rates for India in 1969. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTRY DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES: INDIA, ISP-DP-16, at Table 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as INDIA
PROFILE].
THE MODERN

190

N.

WILLIAMSON, SONS OR DAUGHTERS: A CROSS-CULTURAL SURVEY OF PARENTAL PREF-

ERENCES 103 (1976).
191 L. DUBLIN, A. LOTKA, & M. SPIEGELMAN, LENGTH OF LIFE 129 (rev. ed. 1949).
192Stolnitz, A Century of InternationalMortality Trends II, 10 POPULATION STUD. 17,
23 (1956). Since 1930, even in the West, female death rates exceeded those of men in the
following age groups: ages 1-4, 10-19, Italy, 1931, S. PRESTON, N. KEYFITZ & R. SCHOEN,
CAUSES OF DEATH: LIFE TABLES FOR NATIONAL POPULATIONS 404-07 (1972); ages 25-54,
Netherlands, 1931, id. at 460-63; ages 10-19, Portugal, 1930, id. at 580-83; ages 10-14, Scotland, 1951, id. at 604-07; ages 10-14, Spain, 1930, id. at 640-43; ages 15-19, Sweden, 1930, id.
at 660-63; ages 10-14, Sweden, 1940, id. at 664-67; ages 15-19, Switzerland, 1930, id. at 680-

83.

193 Stolnitz, supra note 192, at 24.
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that higher female mortality for various age groups occurred more
frequently in those countries with the highest overall mortality.
Even in the countries with the lowest mortality, over 10% of the
age-cause-specific categories showed higher female than male mortality. The age categories were concentrated in the childbearing
years, but deaths related to childbirth do not explain the finding:
19 4
neoplasms were the leading cause of higher female mortality.
Professor Retherford, in examining age-specific death rates in
the United States for 1910 and 1965, found that male-female differences declined sharply below the age of 5, remained static at
ages 5-49, and increased sharply above age 50. This suggests that
virtually all of the increased differential in the U.S.-from 1 to 7.7
years since 1920-has occurred at age 50 and older. 195
2. "At All Times During This Century." There is evidence
that greater female longevity is a relatively recent phenomenon.
Analysis of Paleolithic, Mesolithic, and Neolithic burials, as well as
analysis of burials and historical records for the Roman Empire
and medieval Europe, indicates that before the modern era men
outlived women.1 91 Professor Stolnitz found that greater female
longevity among national populations became general in the West
only in the 1930s, and in non-Western Europe a half-decade
later.1 97 Before World War I, higher male life expectancy at some
ages might have been fairly frequent in non-Western Europe; examples include Italy, Austria, Malta, Bulgaria, and possibly Hungary.195 Greater male longevity has persisted to the present in
194 S. PRESTON, supra note 188, at 121-23. Neoplasms include tumors and many forms
of cancer. The age-cause-specific categories are created by cross-classifying age groups by
major causes of death.
195 R. RErHERFORD, supra note 187, at 4. In a later decomposition, he specifies the age
group more precisely as 60-79. Id. at 28. See also S. PRESTON, supra note 188, at 36. Decomposition techniques rely on the fact that any population may be subdivided further into
constituent groups. A rate for that population may be thought of as the weighted average of
the rates for each of the groups. The population rate may be separated into components due
to the constituent rates, to the weights (or composition) of the constituent groups, and
sometimes to an interaction of rates and weights. For example, an SMD may increase because male death rates increase, because female death rates decrease, or because the age
composition of either males or females has changed, putting more persons in the older age
categories where death rates are higher. A decomposition technique can show which of these
causes is operating.
194 A number of such studies are cited in G. AcsADi & J. NEMESKERI, HISTORY OF
HUMAN LIFE SPAN AND MORTALITY 182-259 (1970). Acsadi and Nemeskeri are careful to note
the shortcomings of their data and the critiques made of them. The data are suggestive but
not conclusive.
197 Stolnitz, supra note 192, at 24-25.
1,9 Id. at 24-25. There were exceptions in non-Western Europe after 1935; for example,
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parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 19 Even in the United
States, greater female longevity has not been universal in the twen200
tieth century.
The recency of greater female longevity is inconsistent with
claims that the phenomenon is biological or genetic. In evolutionary terms, a few centuries is an extremely short time.
3. "In Almost All Countries." The statement that female
mortality is lower in "almost all countries" of the world is true
only if we ignore the 73% of the world's population that lives in
less developed countries. The most frequent examples of higher
male expectation of life at birth are in Asia.2 1 An analysis of 78
Asian life tables, mostly from the period 1950-1970, showed higher
male expectation of life at birth in 28% of them. 202 The countries
included India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Khmer Republic, and the
Indian populations of Fiji, Malyasia, and Singapore. More recent
life tables for Nepal, India, and Pakistan, and recent life tables for
Papua New Guinea, also show higher male longevity. 203 Recent life
tables for Indonesia 20 4 and Bangladesh20 5 show no difference be-

ages 1-4, Yugoslavia, 1961, 1964. S.

PRESTON, N. KEYFITZ & R. SCHOEN, supra note 192, at
780-87.
199Stolnitz, supra note 192, at 25. See text and notes at notes 201-207 infra.
100 See notes 219, 240 infra. Legal commentators have overlooked this fact. See Key,

supra note 5, at 4.
201 El-Badry, Higher Female than Male Mortality in Some Countries of South Asia: A
Digest, 64 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 1234 (1969). A measurement problem remains in such studies in determining the accuracy and completeness of the data. Recent advances in demographic technique emphasize adjustments of, and inferences from, incomplete data. Some of
these techniques were applied to data for India, Pakistan, and Nepal by the International
Data Evaluation Branch of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The results of different techniques agreed, and the male advantage in expectation of life at birth remained. INDIA PROFILE, supra note 189, at 1-2, 24; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTRY DEMOGRAPHIC
PROFILES: NEPAL, ISP-DP-21, at 1-2, 22-23, 29 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NEPAL PROFILE];
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTRY DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES: PAKISTAN,

ISP-DP-24, at 2-3,

23-80 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PAKISTAN PROFILE].
202 ECONOMIC COMM'N FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST, UNITED NATIONS, VOMPARATIVE
STUDY OF MORTALITY TRENDS IN ECAFE COUNTRIES, ASIA POPULATION STUDIES SERIES No.

14, at 24, 41-42, 82-86 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ECAFE].
203 DEP'T OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1977 Table 22, at 442-63, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER. R/6 (1978)
(Papua New Guinea, 1970-1975) [hereinafter cited as DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1977]; NEPAL
CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, NEPAL IN FIGURES (1979); INDIA PROFILE, supra note 189, at

Table 5; NEPAL PROFILE, supra note 201, at Table 5; PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 201, at
Table A-4; Van de Kaa, Estimates of Vital Rates and Future Growth, NEW GUINEA RESEARCH BULL. No. 34, Apr. 1970, Table 7, at 1-16.
204

DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK

1970, Table 20, at 710-29 (1971) [hereinafter cited as DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1970]. This is
the table cited by Chief Justice Burger to support the comment that "[g]ender-based actua-
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tween the sexes in life expectation. In.the Middle East, the most
20 6
recent tables for Jordan and Iran show higher male longevity.
Even in Third World countries with higher average female longev207
ity, the SMD tends to be smaller than in the United States.
4. Variations in Developed Countries. Professor Kimball's
statement would be more accurate if it suggested that lower female
mortality is almost universal at older ages, during the past few decades, in the most developed countries. This is a significantly
shrunken universe; at most it suggests that some kind of biological
difference becomes a significant advantage for older women under
the environmental conditions prevailing in developed countries.
But variations among and within the most developed countries
during the past six decades tend to refute even this modified version of the genetic-difference argument. Such variations are substantial, and they are not correlated with level of development.
With greater economic development, two things tend to happen: overall mortality declines, and SMDs increase.2 08 At the very
highest levels of development, however, this relationship breaks
down. First, the association between development and mortality
weakens; for example, the United States ranks only eighth in the
world in female expectation of life at birth and fifteenth in male

rial tables have been in use since at least 1843 and their statistical validity has been repeatedly verified." City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 725-26 & n.2 (1978) (Burger,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is an astonishing table to cite for that
claim, because, for sixty countries, it reports unisex data only. Furthermore, this table shows
higher male expectation of life at birth in six countries.
205 DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1977, supra note 203, Table 22, at 442-63. The countries
mentioned in text and notes at notes 203-205 accounted for 22.5% of the world's population
in 1977. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, WORLD POPULATION 1977 ISP-WP-77 (1978).
210 DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1977, supra note 203, Table 22, at 442-63. Other examples
of higher male expectation of life at birth include El Salvador (1930), Guatemala (1930,
1949-1951), Nigeria (1965-1966), Upper Volta (1960-1961), Liberia (1971), and Asians in
South Africa (1950-1952). E. ARRIAGA, MORTALITY DECLINE AND ITS DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS IN
LATIN AMERICA 46 (1970); DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1977, supra note 203, Table 22, at 44263; DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1974
Table 33, at 1004-34, U.N. Doc. STIESA/STAT/SER. R/3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1974]. See also DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1970, supra note 204, Table
20, at 710-29 (equal life expectancy in Bolivia) (1950).
207 DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1977, supra note 203, Table 22, at 442-63. Dr. Pressat, who
studied pre-industrial European and contemporary developing countries on the theory that
they most closely approximated the state of nature, concluded that any female biological
advantage is less than two years. Pressat, supra note 130, at 105. If one accepts his assumption that biological advantage is best measured in the state of nature, the advantage disappears entirely in light of the prehistoric data. See text at note 196 supra.
20l See ECAFE, supra note 202, at 16-19, 41.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[47:505

expectation of life at birth, 20 9 although it is approximately fourth
in gross national product per capita.21 0 The association between
greater economic development and greater SMDs also breaks
down. European nations or political subdivisions with lower levels
of economic development (Northern Ireland, Denmark) and also
places with higher levels of development (Switzerland, Norway)
have smaller SMDs than the United States. Another group of
countries, with no clear developmental pattern, has larger SMDs:
the Soviet Union, Finland, and France. 211 The absence of any pattern contradicts the simple hypothesis that advanced economic development is a sufficient condition for female biological superiority
to manifest itself.
The range of SMDs in Europe varies from 5.34 years for 19691971 in the German Democratic Republic to 10 years in the
U.S.S.R. in 1971-1972.212 There is no technique for defining which
of these SMDs might represent the "normal" excess of male mortality over female mortality. In lieu of such a technique, Professor
Preston used an orthogonal regression to predict "expected" male
mortality from female mortality. In studying deviations from the
predicted figures, he noted geographic and cultural clustering. One
such pattern appears in Europe, where a central band of countries
exhibiting relatively high male mortality separates two areas of
relatively high female mortality.2 1 8 This pattern suggests a nonbiological explanation, as does the fact that mortality patterns of
European countries do not persist among their emigrant
populations. 14
There are also puzzling variations within individual developed
countries. In the United States in 1969-1971, the male expectation
of life at birth ranged from 60.92 years in the District of Columbia
to 71.02 years in Hawaii. 215 The female range extended from 70.5
209 DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1977, supra note 203, Table 22, at 442-63.
210 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 910. OPEC countries were excluded from
this comparison.
211 UNITED NATIONS, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1977, Table 19, at 80-85, U.N. Doc. ST/
ESA/STAT/SER. S/5 (1978); STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 904, 910.
212 DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1977, supra note 203, Table 22, at 442-63.
213 S. PRESTON, supra note 126, at 138. Preston speculates that regional variations in

blood group and somatotype might play a role. Id. at 141. But see text and note at note 214
infra.
214 See S. PRESTON, supra note 126, at 139; Krueger & Moriyama, Mortality of the
ForeignBorn, 57 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 496 (1967). See also S. LEDERMANN, ALCOOL, ALCOOLisME, ALCoOLISATION 77-89 (1964) (another regional analysis).
215 Greville, supra note 32, at 4-14. Greville discounts racial composition as a factor in
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years in the District of Columbia to. 77.01 years in North Dakota.21 6 Thus the range among males by geographic areas was 10.1
years, larger than the national difference between the sexes, and
the average for men in Hawaii was higher than the average for
women in the District of Columbia. The SMD by state ranged
from 5.77 years in Hawaii to 9.0 years in Wyoming.2 1 7 The former
Confederate states all have SMDs larger than the national figure,
and the industrialized Northern states all have SMDs below the
national figure,2 18 further confounding the notion that SMDs uni219
formly increase with development.
Another geographic variation in SMD is that between urban
and rural residents. A number of studies have documented male
mortality advantages in rural areas, 2 2 0 a result some scholars attribute to greater discrimination against women in rural households.22 1 This, again, suggests the importance of behavioral and environmental factors in explaining the SMD.
5. Animal Studies. Proponents of the genetic argument have
claimed that greater female longevity is almost universal in the
animal kingdom. 2 22 This claim is derived from a 1948 summary of

Hawaii's superior male longevity. Id. at 4-15.
216
217

Id. at 4-14.
Id.

218 Id.
219 Some subpopulations in both the United States and other countries have recorded a
male expectation of life at birth that exceeded the female. These include Negroes in 19191921, id., all of Hawaii in 1910 and 1919-1920, Gardner & Schmitt, Ninety-Seven Years of
Mortality in Hawaii, 32 HAWAI MED. J. 297, 299 (1978), ethnic Hawaiians in 1910 and 1920,
C. PARK, R. GARDNER & E. NORDYKE, LIFE TABLES BY ETHNIC GROUP FOR HAWAII, 1920-1970,
at 12-14 (Hawaii State Dep't of Health R & S Report No. 26, June 1979), Japanese in Hawaii in 1910, id. at 12, and Filipinos in Hawaii in 1920 and 1950, id. at 13, 20. Other examples of provincial SMDs that were negative despite a positive national SMD include five

Japanese prefectures in various years between 1920 and 1935, I.

TAEUBER, THE POPULATION

294 (1958). See also Hanley, Fertility, Mortality, and Life Expectancy in PreModern Japan, 28 POPULATION STUD. 127, 139-40 (1974). A more recent example in a less
developed country is Sabah in Malaysia, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1977, supra note 203, at
456.
2.0 L. DUBLIN, A. LOTKA & M. SPIEGELMAN, supra note 191, at 129; Martin, supra note
130, at 289; World Health Organization, Health Trends and Prospects, 1950-2000, 27
WORLD HEALTH STATISTICAL REP. 672, 688 (1974). But see E. KITAGAWA & P. HAUSER, supra
note 130, at 119 (finding that this difference no longer exists in the United States).
221 R. KENNEDY, THE IRISH: EMIGRATION, MARRIAGE, AND FERTILITY 56-64 (1973); S.
OF JAPAN

PRESTON,

supra note 188, at 149; N.

WILLIAMSON,

supra note 190, at 100.

Kimball, supra note 4, at 88 n.9 (citing R. RETHERFORD, supra note 130, at 101).
Retherford, however, explicitly rejects the inference that Kimball draws from him: that genetic differences are the primary cause of SMDs. Id. at 101.
222
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such studies,2 2 3 and from four species of laboratory animals: fruit

flies, beetles, spiders, and rats.224 More recent research indicates
that among mammals,
higher female mortality is as likely as higher
225
male mortality.

6. Other Evidence. The most superficially convincing argument for a biological basis for SMDs was made by Professor Madigan, who studied both nuns and brothers in Roman Catholic religious teaching orders.226 He eliminated nonwhites, the previously
married, and those who entered religious life after the age of 27,
assuming that his choice of subjects controlled for life style, occupation, marital status, and general sociocultural stress that might
affect mortality. He concluded that biological factors played the
chief part in explaining the superior longevity of the sisters.227 But
several researchers have been critical of his interpretations. 228 The

most serious problem with his research design is that the brothers
were permitted to smoke and drink. 229 Because differences in
smoking behavior account for a large portion of the SMD in the
general population,230 Professor Madigan's study is of no probative
value.
Another argument for a biological basis for SMDs is based on
the large number of sex-linked diseases or developmental disorders
that usually affect only men.2 31 But the fatalities from such sex123

Retherford cites Hamilton, The Role of Testicular Secretions as Indicated by the

Effects of Castration in Man and by Studies of Pathological Conditions and the Short
Lifespan Associated with Maleness, in 3 RECENT PROGRESS IN HORMONE RESEARCH 257
(1948). R. RETHERFORD, supra note 130, at 9. But Hamilton notes many exceptions, and
many of the studies reflect out-of-date or dubious methodologies, such as observations of
sex ratios in herds.
I'l Kailman & Jarvik, Individual Differences in Constitution and Genetic Background,
in HANDBOOK OF AGING AND THE INDIVIDUAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS 216,
230-31 (J.Birren ed. 1959); Gerber, supra note 5, at 1220 n.81 (citing Moore, Mortality and
Morbidity in the Population,in 1 AGING AND SOCIETY 195, 201 (M. Riley & A. Foner eds.
1968)).
25 Caughley, Mortality Patternsin Mammals, 47 ECOLOGY 906 (1966); Waldron, supra
note 177, at 349. The only mammals with higher male mortality reported in Hamilton,
supra note 223, are rats and humans. Male mice outlived females, and studies of cattle
produced inconsistent findings. Id. at 262-63.
"I Madigan, Are Sex Mortality Differentials Biologically Caused?, 35 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 202 (1957).
227 Id. at 221.
228 R. RETHERFORD, supra note 130, at 13; Key, supra note 5, at 6; Waldron, supra note
177, at 350.
229 Madigan, supra note 226, at 204.
230 See text and notes at notes 248-249 infra.
"I Herden, Causes of Excess Male Mortality In Man, 3 AcTA GENETrICA ET STATISTICA
MEDICA 351 (1952). By "sex-linked disease" is meant one related to defects or traits carried
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linked diseases are too rare to have, any substantial effect on
SMDs." 2
A final argument that there is a biological basis for SMDs relies on the possible protective effects of female hormones. Some
studies suggest that estrogen protects against cardiovascular disease in premenopausal women, 33 perhaps because it inhibits cholesterol-deposit formation.3 4 Other studies, however, suggest that
there is no such relationship 23 5 or even that the relationship is reversed under some conditions.23 6 Nor do male hormones seem to be
the operative influence in heart disease.237 Even if estrogen does
turn out to provide significant protection against cardiovascular
disease, this would not make a case for a universal female advantage strong enough to justify using segregated actuarial tables.
Some 32.1% of the female labor force,2 8 and virtually all women
collecting annuities, are beyond the age of menopause. 9
Investigating the differences caused by hormones may be the
most promising avenue for research on biological sources of the
SMD. Yet it is doubtful that much of the current differential can
be attributed to hormones. For even if some female advantage
were biologically based, the sudden widening of the gap in recent
years to six, seven or even ten years must be explained by other
variables.
C. The Instability of SMDs
Perhaps the most difficult datum to reconcile with the biologion the pair of human chromosomes that determine sex.
,2 Waldron, supra note 177, at 356, calculates that deaths due to sex-linked conditions
account for less than 2% of the excess deaths experienced by males up to the end of the
reproductive years.
233 See Higano, Robinson & Cohen, Increased Incidence of CardiovascularDisease in
Castrated Women, 268 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 1123 (1965).
234 R. RETHERFORD, supra note 130, at 15.
215 Ritterband, Jaffe, Densen, Magagna & Reed, Gonadal Function and the Development of CoronaryHeart Disease, 27 CIRCULATION 237 (1963); Waldron, supra note 177, at
352.
136 See Mann & Inman, Oral Contraceptives and Death from Myocardial Infarction,
BRiT. MED. J., May 3, 1975, at 245.
227 Waldron, supra note 177, at 352.
2s Estimated from 1977 data for women aged 45 and older in BUREAU OF LABOR
Tics, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1978, at 29 (1979).

STATIs-

239 Estrogen might protect premenopausal women from heart disease by delaying atherosclerosis. Smoking and cholesterol levels are implicated as causes of atherosclerosis. R.
RETHERFORD, supra note 130, at 15. Thus the possible protective benefits of estrogen might
not be needed by women and men who do not smoke or eat high cholestorol diets.
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cal argument is the rapid change in SMDs in recent years. In the
United States, within the adult life of a single annuitant, the SMD
measured by the expectation of life at birth increased from 1.0
year in 1920 to 7.7 years in 1970;24 0 the SMD at age 65 increased
proportionately.2 41 The general trend in Europe has also been toward an increasing SMD. 242 Demographers have approached the
problem by asking why men in the developed countries die prematurely. This formulation is suggested by the fact that the male expectation of life in the United States is exceeded at birth in Puerto
a
Rico, 43 at age 35 in Albania, Portugal, and Costa Rica, 244 and at
age 65 in the Philippines, Panama, El Salvador, Puerto Rico and
Mexico.

245

Recent studies confirm that the widening of SMDs up to 1970
may be traced principally to higher male mortality from arteriosclerotic heart disease, malignant neoplasms of the respiratory system, bronchopulmonic disease, motor vehicle and other accidents,
cirrhosis of the liver, and suicide.24" These causes of death ac-

counted for three-fourths of the SMD in the United States in 1967.
Behavioral factors such as smoking, drinking alcohol, reckless driving, and the "coronary-prone" or "Type A" personality are implicated in the etiology of each.2 47
The effects of changes in these factors-are most dramatically

240

STATISTICAL

ABSTRACT,

supra note 6, at 70. Female mortality rates in 1920 exceeded

those of men for ages 20-39. S. PRESTON, N. KEYFITZ & R. SCHOEN, supra note 192, at 73235.
241 Compare S. PRESTON, N. KEYFITz & R. SCHOEN, supra note 192, at 732-35 (SMD at
age 65 was .528 years in 1920) with U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 183, at 8-11
(SMD at age 65 was 3.84 years in 1969-1971).
242 Nineteen of twenty-nine European places for which post-1945 life tables were available had steadily increasing SMDs measured by expectation of life at birth. DEP'T OF EcoNOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1960, at 606-08 (1961);
DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1964, at

620-22 (1965); DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1970, supra note 204, at 724-26; DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1974, supra note 206, at 1026-32; DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1976, at 428-32, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER. R/5 (1977);
DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1977, supra note 203, at 456-60.
243 UNITED NATIONS, supra note 211, Table 19, at 80-85.
244 Data for about 1960, cited in S. PRESTON, supra note 126, at 1.
245 S. PRESTON, N. KEYFITz & R. SCHOEN, supra note 192, at 220, 456, 560, 564, 600, 768.
240 E.g., Waldron, supra note 177, at 350.
247 Id. For a similar analysis of data from the Soviet Union, which has the largest national SMD in the world, see Dutton, Changes in Soviet Mortality Patterns, 1959-77, 5
POPULATION & DRY. REV. 267 (1979). Dutton tentatively but persuasively attributes much of
the increased mortality among Soviet males to increased consumption of alcohol; he also
notes, id. at 289 n.2, that increased consumption of tobacco may have played a role.
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illustrated by smoking. Increased male smoking appears to have
accounted for 75%248 or more2 49 of the enormous 1910-1962 increase in SMD in the United States. But recently millions of men
have quit smoking, 250 and women represent the fastest-growing
group of new smokers.25 1
Other contributors to SMD are also changeable, and some appear to be changing. The physical activity required by the typical
job has declined, and this is associated with higher mortality from
heart disease.25 2 The historic predominance of males in the labor
force implies that they might have been affected disproportionately. But now, nearly half the adult population of both sexes is
exercising at least once a week, and men exercise more strenuously
than women.2 53 Occupational hazard was once an important contributor to SMDs, but jobs have become less hazardous,2 54 and women are entering jobs in which they were previously not found,
including hazardous ones. 25 5 There are many hints in the literature
that job-related stress contributes to the higher mortality of males,
and declining occupational segregation might equalize this fac-

248

R. RETHERFORD, supra note 130, at 76-79. See S. PRESTON, supra note 126, at 86-97

(smoking is the "major cause" of mortality changes). Kimball, supra note 4, at 107 n.58,
assumes that genetic differences explain the residual-the part of the SMD not otherwise
accounted for by Retherford's data. But Retherford clearly indicates, R. RETHERFORD, supra
note 130, at 12, 101, that genetic differences could not account for so rapid an increase, and
he explicitly warns against attempting to interpret the residual, id. at 122.
249 S. Preston, Analysis of a Change in Western Mortality Patterns 64, 137 (Ph.D. dissertation, Economics, Princeton University, 1968).
25o STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 126.
251See Lewis & Lewis, The PotentialImpact of Sexual Equality on Health, 297 NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. 863, 865 (1977). Compare U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969, at 80 (90th ed. 1969) with STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra
note 6, at 126.
'2 Menotti & Puddu, Death Rates Among the ItalianRailroad Employees, with Special Reference to CoronaryHeart Diseases and Physical Activity at Work, 11 ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH 331 (1976); Paffenbarger & Hale, Work Activity and Coronary Heart Mortality, 292 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 545 (1975). Earlier studies are reviewed in S. PRESTON, supra
note 126, at 41-42.
253 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 121.

See R. RETHERFORD, supra note 130, at 6, 29.
The "index of dissimilarity," which indicates the percentage of women that would
have to change occupations in order for the sexes to have identical occupational distributions, has slowly but steadily declined from 44.9 in 1965 to 42.3 in 1978. The data upon
254

25

which these calculations are based come from STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 415.

In manufacturing and construction, the percentage of workers who are women rose by one
point between 1977 and 1979. The percentage of all women workers who are in these industries increased from 17.7% to 18.2%. 25 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS

supra note 238, at 564-75.

160 (1978); 27 id. at 181 (1980);

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
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tor.2 5 s Women benefited during this century from the decline in
maternal mortality and from techniques for detecting cancers of
the breast and female reproductive organs. 257 But a new blood test
for detecting prostate cancer may become as beneficial to men as
the Pap smear has been to women, 258 and new techniques of treating cardiovascular disease may disproportionately benefit men.2 59
Effects of such changes are beginning to appear in mortality
data, and may indicate that a decline in the SMD is also beginning. Between 1971 and 1977, the male crude death rate dropped
0.9 per thousand, while the female rate dropped 0.4 per thousand.2 60 The age-specific death rates for both males and females
between ages 45 and 75 declined during these years, but the rate of
male decline was faster-three times faster for males aged 55-64,

2" The evidence on job-related stress at this writing does not suggest any clear pattern.
See S. PRESTON, supra note 126, at 66-68; Johnson, Recent Trends in Sex Mortality Differentials in the United States, J. HuMAN STRESS, Mar. 1977, at 22-23; Waldron, supra note
177, at 355, 358; Waldron, Zyzanski, Shekelle, Jenkins & Tannebaum, The Coronary-Prone
Behavior Patternin Employed Men and Women, J. HUMAN STRESS, Dec. 1977, at 2. But see
Gerber, supra note 9, at 1218-19 (SMIs not affected by females entering labor force).
MEnterline, supra note 177, at 324.
258 See Foti, Cooper, Herschman & Malvaez, Detection of Prostatic Cancer by SolidPhase Radioimmunoassay of Serum Prostatic Acid Phosphatase, 297 NEw ENGLAND J.

MED. 1357 (1977).
259

There is conflicting evidence on whether differential susceptibility to infectious dis-

ease contributed to the SMD. Compare 2 A. MrrRA, INDIA'S POPULATION: AsPECTS OF QUALICONTROL 806 (1978), S. PRESTON, supra note 188, at 121-23, and Gove & Hughes,
Possible Causes of the Apparent Sex Differences in PhysicalHealth: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 44 AM. Soc. REv. 126, 130-31 (1979), with R. RETHERFORD, supra note 130, at 26-29,
and Waldron, supra note 177, at 355-56. Infectious disease is not likely, however, to be an
important factor in the future in the developed countries. There is some evidence that
women are more willing to seek medical attention. Lewis & Lewis, supra note 251, at 866-67;
Verbrugge, Sex Differentials in Morbidity and Mortality in the United States, 23 Soc.
BIOLOGY 275 (1976); Waldron, supra note 177, at 356-57. This could change, but there is no
present evidence that it is changing. There is no conclusive evidence that dietary differences
have contributed to SMDs in the United States, see S. PRESTON, supra note 126, at 40-41,
46-50, 64-65, 68-69; Friedmann & Rosenmann, Comparison of FatIntake of American Men
and Women, 16 CMCULATION 339 (1957), but a general reduction in cholesterol intake might
disproportionately benefit men because of their higher current death rates from heart
disease.
210 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 72. A decomposition of the difference beTY AND

tween the crude rates yielded the components shown in the table below.
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for example. 61 Effects are beginning to appear in life tables. In
Hawaii, the state with the lowest SMD, the SMD at birth dropped
almost two full years to 3.93 years in 1975, from 5.77 years in 19691971.262 Recent European life tables have shown decreases or fluctuations for the SMD in Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, England
and Wales, Greece, Hungary, Malta, and Norway.2 6
These data are important because the improvement in male
mortality has taken place at exactly those ages that contribute the
most to the SMD-those over 50. Moreover, the decline is coming
largely from reduced cardiovascular deaths, the cause of death
most prominently associated with the SMD. Death rates from
heart disease declined by 14.3 per 100,000 women between 1970
and 1977, but for males the decline was 45.8 per 100,000. The most
dramatic "saving" was among men aged 65 or over, for whom the
decline amounted to 418.2 per 100,000.264 These data offer the pos-

MALES

Total change, 1971-1977
1. Component due to decline in
death rates
2. Component due to age
structure
3. Interactions of age and rates

FEMALES

-0.9

-0.4

-1.4

-1.3

0.5
0.0

0.8
0.1

The decomposition formula appears in Kitagawa, Components of a Difference between Two
Rates, 50 J. AM. STATIsTIcAL A. 1168 (1955). The decomposition indicates that the decline in
death rates is larger for men than women even after taking account of the fact that there are
more females in the older ages subject to higher death rates. This casts doubt on the conclusions of one researcher skeptical about a possible decline in SMD, Johnson, supra note 256,
at 22. Although he recognizes the contribution played by both rates and changes in the
population's age composition, id. at 23, his use of age-adjusted mortality rates controls composition but fails to identify changes in rates and in the interactions of rates and age composition. A decomposition technique is more convincing. Our use of more recent data also
contributes to some of the disparity in conclusions, as does his use of ratios instead of differences. His data, id. at 26-27, show that since 1968 the male-female difference for age-adjusted rates of death from all causes and from major cardiovascular disease has declined.
Only the ratio between the male and female rates has increased; this results from a small
denominator (the female death rate) getting even smaller.
261

STATISTIcAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 72.

262 Gardner & Schmitt, supra note 219, at 298-300; Greville, supra note 32, at 4-14. The
national SMD at birth has fluctuated between 7.6 and 7.8 years since 1970. STATSTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 70.
243 Authorities cited note 242 supra. Smaller fluctuations were also recorded in
Romania and Yugoslavia.
2 4 STATIsTIcAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 78. There are also limited data that suggest
increased female mortality from lung cancer, and from some minor causes of death. Lewis &
Lewis, supra note 251, at 867; Verbrugge, supra note 259, at 279; Waldron, Sex Mortality
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sibility that the SMD might be reduced through improvements in
male mortality, and that the improvement will most benefit those
males of an age to receive pensions.
The variations in SMD over time and space, and the role of
environmental and behavioral factors in explaining the variations,
suggest that a biological or genetic explanation is seriously deficient. It might be argued that some of the behavior patterns are
biologically caused, but the evidence for this is weak and unpersuasive. The coronary-prone or Type A personality, reckless driving,
and suicides, behavioral patterns that disproportionately characterize males, may reflect the generally higher aggressive tendencies
of men in industrial societies, and there is in fact some evidence
that aggressiveness is related to male sex hormones.2 6 5 But there
are wide individual and cultural variations in the degree of aggressiveness displayed by males. 2 6 And neither these traits nor their
consequences are limited to men. The Type A personality, for example, substantially increases the risk of coronary heart disease at
all ages in both sexes. Post-menopausal Type A women have the
same high rates of coronary heart disease as Type A men over 50,
and at all ages, Type B men-those without the coronary-prone
personality-have the same low rates as Type B women.26 7
D.

The Changing Composition of the Insured Population

Insurance industry mortality tables are based on the actual experience of annuitants, not on census data or vital statistics for
entire populations. 26 8 This means that another changing factor is
the composition of the insured population. In the cohorts that have
recently entered the labor force, pension coverage is much more
widespread26s and female labor force participation rates are much
Differentials, J. HUMAN STRESS, June 1977, at 46; Waldron & Johnston, Why Do Women
Live Longer Than Men?, J. HUMAN STRESS, June 1976, at 19, 23-24.
25 E. MACCOnY & C. JACKLIN, supra note 133, at 242-47, 274.
2"6 See, e.g., R. DENTAN, THE SEMsx-A NONVIOLENT PEOPLE OF MALAYA (1968); E. MAcCOBY & C. JACKLIN, supra note 133, at 247, 372; M. MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE

(1935).
Waldron, supra note 177, at 351. These findings should be considered preliminary,
because they are based on small-scale retrospective studies. Large-scale prospective studies
show that Type A men are twice as likely as other men to develop coronary heart disease.
Id. See also Waldron, Zyzanski, Shekelle, Jenkins & Tannebaum, supra note 256.
Kimball, supra note 4, at 108.
269 Davis & Strassen, PrivatePension Plans 1960 to 1969: An Overview, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., July 1970, at 45; Skolnick, Private Pension Plans 1950-74, Soc. SECURITY BULL., July
1976, at 3; Yohalem, Employee-Benefit Plans, 1975, Soc. SEcuRrrY BULL., Nov. 1977, at 19.
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higher 270 than in the older cohorts whose deaths are the basis of
industry tables. For example, data from the birth cohort of 19051911 indicate that only 21% of privately employed women were
covered by pension plans on their 2longest
job, and of those only
71
benefits.
receiving
actually
are
55%
The most likely women to be covered by a pension were those
273
who had worked continuously, 272 who had earned a high salary,
and whose longest jobs had been professional and technical, or
clerical,2 74 and in the transportation, communication, utilities,
finance, insurance, and real estate industries.2 7 5 Thus, it is possible
that the women on whom the annuity tables are based were an
elite group whose greater longevity has temporarily exaggerated
the SMD in industry tables. 276 If further research confirms that
insurance industry tables do exaggerate the SMD in this way, then
changes in the size and characteristics of the insured female population-in addition to all of the other variables that affect the

270

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,

supra note 238, at 26-27.

271 Thompson, supra note 113, at 5, 8. This study, although rich in data, is hampered

by a flaw in design. Women were included only if they had no husband present in the household. To test whether our findings may be generalized, we turned to data on the total money
income of women aged 65 and over in 1975, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT, SERIES P-23, No. 85, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OLDER
POPULATION 23, 27 (1979). These data strongly suggest that the pension benefits of women
reported by Thompson probably overstate the work-related income of older married women.
2'7 Thompson, supra note 113, at 5.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
17 On the association between mortality and socioeconomic status, see note 130 supra.
The insurance industry has not published the data necessary to test the hypothesis that
their tables are based on an elite group of long-lived females, and the sketchy data that are
available conflict. One study by TIAA-CREF reports that there is no difference in the mortality experience of its primary female annuitants (covered working women) and its secondary female annuitants (the wives of covered working men). R. DUNCAN, supra note 117. But
this insurance pool consists of upper-level white-collar workers whose overall mortality is
likely to be low because of their socioeconomic status, which is shared by their immediate
families. A study of Railroad Retirement Board beneficiaries shows "slightly longer life expectancies at all ages 60 and over for female retired employees than for wives and widows of
male retired employees." Id. at 1. In this pool, women workers may have been disproportionately white collar, so that they did not necessarily share the socioeconomic status of
male coworkers and their wives. Data on individual annuitants indicate some self-selection
by healthy women. Metropolitan Life, supra note 117, at 5. But this kind of self-selection is
less likely to operate in employer-sponsored pension plans, because participation is often
mandatory. Data on individual life insurance holders show little difference in the SMD between policy holders and the general population. Id. at 4; SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, supra note
117, reprinted in U.S. COMM'N ON CIIL RIGHTS, supra note 115, at 547. Data on employersponsored pension plans are not readily available.
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SMD-may affect the industry's future experience.
E.

Implications of the Demographic Evidence

It is convenient to "explain" sex-based differences as biological in origin, just as it was once fashionable to "explain" racial differences in similar terms. But these "explanations" fail because
they are post hoc theorizing with no power to predict changes in
SMD. 177 Characterization is not analysis.
This is not to say that there are no genetic or biological differences that may affect SMDs. But any that may exist are of no help
in making predictions because they are overwhelmed by other factors. It would be no help to insurers to identify a biological tendency to a one-year female advantage if-environmental and behavioral factors can cause much larger variations in either direction. It
seems unlikely that any separable increment of biological advantage will be identified. Further research is likely to reveal increasingly complex interactions of biological, environmental, and behavioral factors, rather than separately measurable years of SMD
attributable to separate factors.2 78
Whatever the causes of differential male and female life expectancy, the fact that is most damaging to proponents of segregated
tables is that SMDs change rapidly. The most that an insurer can
do to reflect these changes is to calculate a new period life table.
But that table is constrained by the same assumption as the old
one: that the experience of workers who have already died is the
best guide to predicting the mortality of young workers who are
living. The life table applied to a 20-year-old in 1980 who will retire in 2030 is based on men who were 20 years old in 1920, 1930,
or 1940, and who have already died. But in that century between
1930 and 2030 many unpredictable changes can occur.
The problem is tolerable in predicting overall mortality. Rates
can be set conservatively to assure sufficient funds to pay claims
arising under any likely set of future conditions. But prediction of
SMDs is much more difficult, and an error in either direction is
equally serious. Insurers make their predictions without a theoretical basis in biology or sociology, on the basis of recent life tables
that might reflect mere historic anomalies in the SMD. There is no

277

future.

The test of a scientific theory is its ability to predict, within specified conditions, the

27 See R. RETHERFORD, supra note 130, at 12; Kitagawa, supra note 182, at 385.
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reason to believe that the long-term trend reliably predicts even
the direction of future changes. Moreover, the magnitude of potential errors is enormous in proportion to the difference being predicted.279 Thus an employer who classifies his employees by sex
and then attempts to distribute total annuity benefits proportionately between the two groups-the goal of segregated tables-must
be very lucky indeed to avoid giving one group significantly more
than its "share."
CONCLUSION

Equal treatment of individuals and equal outcomes for groups
are powerful competing themes in civil rights law, and the tension
between the two increases as the conviction spreads that equal
treatment will not soon bring group equality for minorities. The
result is that we are now in the midst of a profound national debate over affirmative action, and an old-fashioned argument for
equal treatment of individuals must distinguish or repudiate each
new group-based approach. These developments should not be allowed to obscure the central point. The primary commitment of
the statute, and of the American civil rights tradition, is to equal
treatment of individuals. The rationales that are offered for attention to groups in the affirmative action context do not apply to
actuarial tables, and the debate over such tables should not be
caught up in the debate over affirmative action.
Curiously, however, the proponents of segregated tables do not
rely on the affirmative action analogy, and generally think racial
preferences undesirable. Their insistence on group equality in the
actuarial context is inconsistent with their insistence on individual
equality in the affirmative action context. The rationales that
might be proposed to reconcile these inconsistent views-that Congress surely did not mean to change established practices, or that
only inefficient discrimination is prohibited-are essentially hostile
to the statute. All of these arguments collapse once it is established
that the statute requires equal treatment of individuals. Most of
them also fall on their own terms, for sex turns out to be a spurious, weak, and unstable predictor of mortality. Manhart is rightly

279 The 6.7-year change in the SMD at birth in the United States from 1920 to 1970 is
670% of the 1920 SMD, and 88% of the 1970 SMD. An 88% increase in current human
longevity would create a life expectancy of over 130 years.
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decided, and the Court should not hesitate to apply its logic to all
other forms of employer-sponsored insurance plans.

